The Crisis in Atlantica


Atlantica Scenario Background

Listen to two simulated on-the-ground news broadcasts about the crisis in Atlantica:

REVISED
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
REPUBLIC OF ATLANTICA
v.1.2.

Map of Atlantica

Figure 1: Map of Atlantica. (Click on the map to open a window with an enlarged image of the map).
SOURCE: Paul Forage.

Background

  1. Atlantica is a small pro-Western Eurasian republic. Since gaining their independence from Great Britain in 1985, its people had been living in relative harmony and have enjoyed a fair degree of economic prosperity. Their prosperity was based on a thriving tourist industry, burgeoning trade, and a close relationship with the United States Government and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). The USAF has an important forward operating base and airfield located in the northern part of the country.
     
  2. This prosperity, however, concealed the underlying political and cultural divisions in the Republic between the ruling majority population in the northern lowlands and its southern highland minorities with their own historical and intensely tribal traditions. Though racially identical, Atlanticans are distinguished by culture, religion, and ethnicity, and separated by artificial political, economic, and educational barriers. This separation is in part due to differences in geography: the northern half has wide plains and fertile fields while the south is mountainous.
     
  3. North Atlanticans have long enjoyed political and economic advantages in the Republic. Atlantican government leaders and politicians, despite their pro-democracy claims, cling to a electoral system that only allows traditional land owners the right to vote, with the result that the majority of seats in the Atlantican Parliament are held by Northern representatives. The Constitution of the Republic excludes minority rights by imposing restrictions on land ownership that result in the disenfranchisement of Southerners. A few Southerners have been able to gain a degree of social status by entering into business arrangements with ethnic Northerners or by marrying into Northern families, though the later is frowned upon socially and actively discouraged by the Government of the Republic of Atlantica.
     
  4. The long term trend, however, is a slow decline in Northern privilege and increasing Southern representation in the Atlantican Parliament, with a concurrent rise in ethnic and political tensions. The last election in 2005 led to the formation of a minority government. The coalition is led by the long time ruling Atlantica Renewal Party (ARP) (35% of the popular vote) together with the Conservative Party of Atlantica (CPA) (30%), leaving the ethnic southern New World Party (NWP) in opposition with 35% of the vote. Southern professionals have found themselves out of work or passed over for promotion in favor of their ethnic Northern colleagues. The Republic's security forces, comprised of a small British-trained and US-equipped Army (Army of the Republic of Atlantica) and a National Police Force, are dominated by a Northern officer corps.
     
  5. As long as its economy generated some wealth for all its citizens, the Republic was at relative peace and its government stable. While poor and disenfranchised by the North, South Atlanticans had been enjoying increasing prosperity as a result of recent discoveries of valuable mineral deposits in the highlands.
     
  6. With increasing prosperity and education Southerners in Atlantica began agitating for more political freedoms, demanding democratic reforms and redress of the basic inequities in Atlantican society. Key demands included:
    • Equity in government and law enforcement hiring;
    • Greater local administrative autonomy for predominantly Southern areas;
    • Repeal of constitutional restrictions on Southern land ownership.
  7. At first the Atlantican Government ignored these demands. This resulted in a popular campaign of non-violent agitation within the Southern community including rallies and protests that garnered international support and wide publicity for the Southern cause. General strikes in Southern mines in September 2007 organized by the New World Party brought the regional economy to a standstill. The Government reacted by mounting a public information campaign and appointed several government committees "to study the legitimate grievances of the Southern minorities." NWP and Southern tribal leaders denounced these actions as little more than window-dressing.
     
  8. Strikes in the mining industry and increasing communal violence prompted a robust response by the Minister for National Security William H. Barfield II. Barfield is a prominent hard-line figure in the CPA, a favorite at Atlantican political rallies, and is extremely popular among the Army and National Police rank and file. Under attack by his critics in Parliament, Atlantican President Anderson appointed Barfield Minister in 2006 to appease Atlantican conservatives and reorganized all security, police, and military forces in the Republic under the Ministry for National Security (MNS).
     
  9. The MNS under the 2006 Security Reform Act changed the position of the national security advisor to the President to an executive ministerial position with full authority over the Atlantican security apparatus "in consultation" with the office of the President. The 2006 Security Reform Act prompted many observers in the United States to decry the emergence of a new "national security state" in the Republic. Atlantican spokesmen responded that these changes merely "streamlined" the Atlantican security apparatus. They claimed that the United States Government and its air base "benefit directly from this enhanced and rationalized security infrastructure."
     
  10. Since 2006 there has been little political or economic improvement since the Atlantican government adopted its hard-line policies. Many important Northern-owned mines remained closed in South. Some local populations are reduced to subsistence livelihoods. There are occasional reports of famine in some tribal areas in south central Atlantica.
     
  11. Some Southern tribesmen have taken up arms and have launched sporadic attacks against Atlantican security forces. They are actively hostile to any outsiders who entire their tribal areas. Government spokespersons refer to these armed groups as "bandits and criminals" who will be "dealt with severely." In retaliation, tribesmen have attacked some Army patrols with landmines and IEDs.
     
  12. Despite the hostility of some traditional tribal leadership, a few humanitarian aid organizations have been successful in entering Southern communities to deliver food aid and medical care. The Government of the Republic of Atlantica and the Army support these efforts reluctantly and only because of pressure from the international community. Some northern Atlanticans believe incorrectly that these aid agencies are sustaining and widening the conflict.
     
  13. In February 2008, a 6.8 degree magnitude (Richter scale) earthquake struck south central Atlantica with devastating results. Initial estimates by international aid workers already in the area count at least 2,000 people killed outright and at least another 5,000 injured and 150 missing. Many villages and hamlets in the area have suffered severe damage rendering many local structures uninhabitable. More than 10,000 people are homeless. Many local schools are damaged and the few hospitals in the region are significantly damaged and operating at only 40% capacity. There also major damage to the dam that retains a regional reservoir. Large amounts of water are pouring from this dam and there is some danger of flooding. Persistent aftershocks continue to afflict the area causing wide-spread concern.
     
  14. Because its own emergency management capabilities have been overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, the Government of Atlantica has requested humanitarian assistance from the United States for its earthquake-stricken area. As the United States Government (USG) considers Atlantica an important strategic ally, the U.S. government is organizing a quick response to the humanitarian crisis in part to prevent the situation in the country from becoming more unstable. Atlantican and American planners have divided afflicted region in South Atlantica into several Areas of Responsibility (AORs). The Atlantican Government has asked the United States to be responsible for organizing and delivering relief efforts to the Atlantican central highlands.
     
  15. The Atlantican Government has expressed its gratitude for this humanitarian assistance as the scale of the disaster has overwhelmed its own emergency response capabilities. However the government is either ambivalent or hostile to external efforts to mediate the internal political crisis and will only accept a limited number of military personnel to operate on its territory. The government welcomes civilian aid workers and emergency personnel and will provide security.

Friendly Forces

  1. United States: Given the simmering conflict in the disaster area, the United States has requested and been given permission to position a small but capable Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Quick Reaction Force (QRF) inside Atlantican territory at the USAF facility to provide additional security for U.S. and Macedonian humanitarian personnel should the need arise. The U.S. airfield will also serve as a staging area for disaster relief efforts.
     
  2. IOs/NGOs: Some International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and additional NGO personnel are conducting HA operations in the affected area.
     
  3. Atlantican Forces: Elements of the 2nd Bn (SOC) of the 1st Army of the Republic of Atlantica (ARA) are conducting security operations in the AOR. Uniform: Standard US pattern BDUs, SOC ARA does not wear unit insignia. ARA Emblem: Winged "Sword of the Republic" on OD Background. Equipment: US made small arms; M4A1 is the weapon of choice. Significant presence of armed and unarmed Ministry of National Security operators in civilian dress, distinguished only by MNS documentation/identity cards and two-way radios. MNS emblem: "Sword of the Republic" on a red background.
     
  4. Intermediaries: The Anglican Church of Atlantica is willing to serve as an intermediary between agencies and armed groups in the AOR.
     

Enemy Forces

  1. Small numbers of armed tribesmen and sympathizers are resident in the AOR. Uniform: Tribesmen wear civilian dress. Weapons: small arms, mostly former Eastern-block or captured ARA equipment, some capability for manufacturing bombs, landmines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), no known WMD capabilities.
     

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION (COA)

Government of Atlantica COA

  1. The Government of Atlantica will continue its effort to eliminate all armed groups and rebuild their country. It is expected to be cooperative with U.S. forces. However, U.S. forces can expect ARA and security forces to resist/deny any direct supervision or observation of their activities. American news services, academics, activists, and several congressional representatives have been critical of the repressive actions taken by Atlantican government and its security forces.
     
  2. A U.S. effort to moderate the Atlantican position and encourage long-term negotiations with the Southern community is the one source of friction between the two governments despite the natural disaster. The Atlantican position is further aggravated by the human rights criticisms of the international press, the UN and international NGOs. The Atlantican Government is grateful, however, for their humanitarian relief efforts as long as they remain "neutral" and do not support the Southern causes.
     

IO/NGO Course of Action

  1. The idea of the 'humanitarian imperative' and a-political 'humanitarian space are central to relief operations. The UN and the international community nonetheless feed into a complex and changing political environment through their very presence. These organizations will likely perceive that working closely with the military and opposition groups in Atlantica only makes them political actors whose resources can be used to further domestic political agendas. This is especially the case as they move from the rescue and relief operations into the reconstruction/rehabilitation phases.1
     
  2. Two INGOs are now present in the Republic - they are International Humanitarian Action and "Rights Without Borders." (RWB). IHA is concerned with relieving the humanitarian crisis and providing aid to all citizens of Atlantica. This equitable approach has generated some conflict with Atlantican security forces on the grounds that IHA should not be, as some Atlanticans describe it, "providing food and medicine to the bandits." There is no evidence that any IHA aid has been misused.
     
  3. is a vocal American and European human rights advocacy group highly critical of the Atlantican government and its security forces. It is also critical of the U.S. Government and U.S. Army for supporting Atlantican security forces. RWB activists have held regular press conferences denouncing ARA actions and have issued a number of high profile calls for a "neutral and impartial" international intervention.
     
  4. So far the Atlantican government has tolerated the presence of this group in its effort to demonstrate its good will to the United States and the international community, but members of the hard-line CPA have called for the arrest and deportation of RWB personnel in the wake of the Director's statement. Southern civil rights advocates have received death threats from unknown Atlantican groups demanding their withdrawal. As a result, RWB is expected to extend their "protective accompaniment" and "emergency notification network" to Southern civil rights activists. This move will place U.S. civilian nationals in danger as they accompany threatened Southerners 24 hours/day and speak on their behalf to the U.S. and international media. It will also subject U.S. forces to additional public, media, and congressional scrutiny if RWB activates its network. RWB workers, regardless of nationality, may be subject to arrest by Atlantican security forces or attack by Atlantican extremists.
  5. The following are some measures that may be used by these and other international organizations working in Atlantica to counter their existing political partisanship:
    • Stress local partnerships with secular NGOs and civil society groups, rather than ideological or missionary groups.
    • Develop mechanisms to empower locals (residents) and district governments' and consult them in the decision-making process about reconstruction and rehabilitation in the earthquake-devastated areas.
    • Seek to ensure that elected federal and provincial legislative bodies, rather than the military, oversee and scrutinize relief and reconstruction operations.
    • International Organizations must shift their approach from being 'embedded' with the military to one that involves effective partnership with the civil society.
    • Demand that the official relief and reconstruction agencies are duly constituted by parliament and contain civilian and cross-party representation.
    • Ensure that there is proper accountability for the earthquake relief funds by stressing on the Atlantican government to appoint an independent monitor to review how the funds are disbursed.

References:

1. Adapted from Thomas Bamforth and Jawad Hussain Qureshi, "Political Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention in the Pakistan Earthquake," Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, January 2007, http://jha.ac/2007/01/16/political-complexities-of-humanitarian-intervention-in-the-pakistan-earthquake/