A bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian response

by Jane Barry with Anna Jefferys

ABSTRACT

Since the early 1990s, military forces have become increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance. This encroachment into what has traditionally been seen as 'humanitarian space' raises significant issues of principle, as well as policy and operational questions not only for humanitarian agencies, but also for the international community as a whole. These questions have only become more urgent in the wake of the war in Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September, and the increasingly explicit linkage of military, political and humanitarian aims that it has engendered.

Some analysts consider this merging of humanitarian, political and military roles and goals inevitable, practical and desirable. Others believe that, in the attempt to bring political, military and humanitarian objectives within the same framework, there is a danger that humanitarian objectives and principles will be compromised; as a result, the capacity to alleviate suffering will be diminished. Still others take a pragmatic approach to civil-military cooperation, establishing policy and negotiating the more contentious 'grey areas' on a case-by-case basis.

Despite its importance, the debate over the proper roles of humanitarian actors and military forces and the relationship between them is relatively young and anecdotal. Detailed analysis is lacking, and few guidelines for policy or practice have been developed. This paper aims to clarify the key issues of debate, and puts forward recommendations to further dialogue, and to guide policy and practice.
Notes on the Authors

Jane Barry is an independent consultant specialising in humanitarian policy, assessments and evaluations. When she wrote this paper, she was Emergencies Policy Advisor at Save the Children UK. Anna Jefferys works as a policy officer in the Emergencies section of Save the Children UK.
# Table of contents

**Executive summary** 1

**Chapter 1 The politics of peace operations** 3
- A reas of contact 4
- M ilitary policies and doctrines 5
- C ountervailing pressures 6
- W hen is military intervention legitimate? 9

**Chapter 2 The humanitarian perspective** 11
- P roblems of principle 11
- P roblems of utility 13

**Chapter 3 Towards a framework for civil–military relations** 15
- R ecommendations 15
- P rinciples of engagement 16

**Conclusion** 19

**Annex 1** 21

**Annex 2** 25

**References** 27

**Interviews** 30

**List of boxes**
- Box 1: T he main parties to the debate 2
- Box 2: D efining ‘peace operations’ 3
- Box 3: N on-Western regional peace and security bodies 4
- Box 4: T he European R apid R eaction F orce 6
- Box 5: T he Brahimi report on U N  peace operations 8
- Box 6: C rossing language boundaries Kosovo as a ‘humanitarian war’ 9
- Box 7: E xisting guidelines 12
Since the beginning of the 1990s, military peacekeeping forces have increasingly intervened in countries in conflict, forcing a more direct engagement than ever before between the military, local populations and humanitarian agencies. Within this context, the military has, to varying degrees, become involved in a relatively new territory, namely humanitarian assistance. This engagement has ranged from the provision of armed protection for humanitarian convoys to the direct implementation of relief aid distributions. As the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) puts it, there is an ‘evolution of military thinking in regard to the provision of humanitarian aid and services. In NATO and elsewhere there has been an evolution of the doctrine of military-civilian operations, with an increasing tendency for military forces being used to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, and sometimes even to provide this aid directly’ (OCHA, 2001).

Military movement into what has traditionally been ‘humanitarian space’ raises significant issues of principle, as well as policy and operational questions, for the entire international community, including governments, the military, humanitarian agencies and the UN. While members of the international community discuss ways to clarify and improve relations between international peacekeeping forces and humanitarian actors in conflicts, these debates have tended to focus on improving relations through increased understanding, with an eye to developing an integrated, or at least closely coordinated, ‘military-humanitarian’ relief response. This view is based on the premise that the military should maintain – and in some cases even increase – its involvement in humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. This issue has become much more urgent in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September and the subsequent US-led military action in Afghanistan, with some key Western politicians explicitly calling for a merger of political, military and humanitarian aims. In January 2002, the UK government’s Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) announced that it would consider bids from the UK-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for humanitarian work in Afghanistan, should these projects meet CHAD’s selection criteria.

Despite a proliferation of conferences, reports and publications on the subject, analysis of civil-military relations is limited, and practical policy guidelines are relatively undeveloped. Most publications conclude that increased military engagement in humanitarian assistance is inevitable, and to a certain degree welcome and acceptable. According to this view, increased cooperation between groups is required in order to improve the overall effectiveness of the peace support operation, thereby also enhancing humanitarian assistance efforts. The main barrier to improved cooperation is simple ‘misunderstanding’, to be resolved through more joint training, conferences and academic programmes. This will bring the relevant groups closer together, and resolve the ‘culture clashes’ that seem to engender mistrust.

This paper argues that these propositions are based on several faulty premises. First, while increased military engagement in humanitarian assistance activities may be a possible future trend, a number of military, political and humanitarian analysts have begun to seriously question whether this is an appropriate direction for peace support operations, concluding that the differences in approach and aims go beyond mere misunderstanding. Second, the idea that increased cooperation – and with it coordination – will itself improve humanitarian assistance is a pernicious but relatively unchallenged assumption. However, there is no clear evidence that indicates a significant correlation between military and humanitarian coordination in the field and the quality or
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance efforts. Finally, the simplistic perception that barriers between humanitarian agencies and the military are based in misunderstandings and cultural clashes glosses over much deeper, intrinsic differences between core aims and principles.

There are profound differences between the mandates, missions and principles of formal military forces and humanitarian agencies. The military has a core mandate to foster security and protect civilians by establishing and enforcing a safe and stable environment. Humanitarian agencies, by contrast, have a mandate to directly implement humanitarian aid programmes. It is essential that these two roles—impartial humanitarian assistance as a response to an urgent and inalienable right, and peace operations with their inevitably partial and political mandates—are kept separate.

Box 1: The main parties to the debate

The civil–military debate involves a vast array of actors, including UN agencies, governments, military forces, NGOs and academics. While many of these actors do not always fit into homogenous or clearly defined categories, for the purposes of this paper it is possible to identify three discrete groups:

- humanitarian actors;
- political actors; and
- military actors.

Humanitarian actors

The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) defines humanitarian agencies as ‘all those operational organisations whose work is based upon the principle of humanity: to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found … to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being’ (McClellan, 2000). These agencies can be classified into the following four sub-groups, based on an adaptation of ICRC’s humanitarian system typology (Bonard, 1999):

- National and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This group comprises organisations that provide humanitarian or relief assistance, such as Save the Children (SCF), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam.
- All ‘mixed’ organisations. A ‘mixed’ organisation is any organisation that lies between an NGO and an implementing body. This includes UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and non-governmental organisations with an international mandate, such as the members of the Red Cross movement.
- Human rights organisations. This group includes NGOs that advocate on issues to do with human rights law, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
- All implementing legal bodies. This group covers bodies that uphold human rights law, refugee law or international humanitarian law, for example the European Court of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Political actors

In terms of the CIMIC debate, this paper understands the political sector to mean state governments and inter-governmental organisations, notably the UN and the European Union (EU), as well as donor and other government agencies.

Military actors

The military comprises national and regional forces and UN peacekeeping forces; third-party military service providers; mercenaries; and private military and security companies.

Other actors also play a role in influencing the debate over civil–military relations. The media, for example, can be instrumental in decisions on military involvement in humanitarian activities by informing the public and swaying opinion through coverage of emergencies. Commercial organisations, ranging from businesses such as oil companies to implementing contractors like the British company Crown Agents, may also play a role, as can academics (as observers and commentators) and the general public, in beneficiary areas, donor countries and internationally.
The politics of peace operations

Three main types of 'peacekeeping' bodies have historically engaged in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations: the UN, regional security coalitions and national armies – each with different agendas, jurisdictions, aims and approaches. The UN has launched all of its peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of its Charter, that is, with the consent of the opposing parties. These missions have involved the deployment of peacekeepers to implement an agreement approved by those parties. An operation under Chapter VII – peace enforcement – does not require the consent of the parties. In this case, the Security Council gives member states the authority to take all necessary measures to achieve a stated objective. The Security Council has approved Chapter VII operations in cases such as the Gulf War, and in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bonn, Albania, Kosovo and East Timor. However, the UN did not control these Chapter VII enforcement operations; they have always been implemented by either a single country or a group of countries. In addition to UN-sanctioned operations, there have been several 'unilateral interventions' that have not enjoyed Security Council authorisation. NATO's Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 is perhaps the most well-known recent example of such a unilateral intervention, which was essentially 'self-mandated' by the NATO Council, the Alliance's political leadership. Only after the air strikes ended on 10 June did the Security Council retrospectively authorise the operation.

Until the 1990s, 'humanitarian' activities were not included in peacekeeping mandates (Thornberry, 1996). The 1956 United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), established at the time of the Suez crisis, is regarded as the model for 'classic' or 'traditional' peacekeeping operations (Laurence, 1999). The peacekeepers were lightly armed, and only permitted to fire in self-defence. This type of peacekeeping involved the following tasks:

- investigating and monitoring ceasefire violations and other incidents;
- undertaking stabilising tasks, such as brokering local commanders' agreements over demarcation of boundaries;
- defusing incidents, for example by brokering 'mini-ceasefires' halting local incidents of conflict; and

Box 2: Defining 'peace operations'

Peace operations – ‘operations other than war’, in the military lexicon – are generally understood to refer to military actions conducted in support of non-military efforts to establish and maintain peace. Within this broad description, there are various ‘degrees’ of activity. Peacekeeping means military operations undertaken with the consent of all the major parties to a dispute, primarily to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreement, commonly a ceasefire or a truce. Traditionally, this has meant the interposition of a neutral military force between the warring sides. For nearly three decades, for instance, the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights has monitored the ceasefire between Israeli and Syrian forces that ended conflict between the two countries in 1974. Peace enforcement, by contrast, means the application or threat of military force without the consent of all warring parties and generally in the absence of an agreed ceasefire. It is designed to compel compliance with measures aimed at maintaining or restoring peace. Such interventions include the US-led action in Iraq in 1991 and NATO's Kosovo air strikes in 1999.
aid agencies and the military

- communicating between parties with no diplomatic relations.

This model gave way to a 'new' form of peacekeeping with the end of the Cold War. This comprised three major changes (Lowe, 2000):

- increased numbers of peacekeeping operations;
- an expanded and more dangerous form of operations; and
- an emphasis on 'humanitarian intervention' in many of the operations.

With the introduction of more robust, expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the 1990s, civil–military relations gained increasing relevance. This is particularly the case around the interventions in the Balkans, and in Afghanistan. Threats to security have evolved to encompass military threats, threats to stability posed by ecological damage, poverty, population growth, inequality and terrorist attacks. Under this rubric, donor governments have gained greater leeway to disregard sovereignty to monitor such things as the status of women, and domestic economic policy (Curtis, 2001). At the same time, the arena of peacekeeping has also changed in line with the developing strategic priorities of the major players. Thus, Western disengagement with Afghanistan prior to 11 September stands in stark contrast to developments since then. Similarly, there is little likelihood that the US will substantially reduce its presence in the Balkans unless stability there significantly improves. However, in other, less pressing regions, countries like the US and the UK may be slower to intervene directly, preferring instead to channel efforts through train-and-equip programmes aimed at 'regionalising' peacekeeping.

Areas of contact

On the ground, contact between humanitarian workers and the military tends to focus on three key areas, in addition to the rare cases where the military has itself directly delivered large-scale assistance: the use of military assets such as aircraft to assist agencies in delivering relief; the use of military forces to protect relief supplies, convoys and staff against theft and attack; and information-sharing.

Box 3: Non-Western regional peace and security bodies

The debate over civil–military relations has tended to focus primarily on Western militaries. As a result, 'non-Western' regional peace and security bodies, particularly from Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are often overlooked. Five major African organisations are involved in peacekeeping in one form or another. All of them function under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU):

- the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west;
- the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the south;
- the Inter-Governmental Developmental Authority (IGAD) in the east;
- the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the north; and
- the Economic Community of Central African States in the central region.

Of these five, only ECOWAS, the SADC and IGAD have to date mobilised peace support operations. The best-known of these interventions are the ECOWAS deployments of Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau during the 1990s. Notably, the operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were undertaken without UN Security Council authorisation.

The other major site of 'non-Western' peacekeeping in the 1990s has been the CIS. Since 1992, Russia and other CIS countries have launched 'peacekeeping operations' in the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan. The operations in Georgia and Tajikistan were monitored by smaller UN missions, although none of the CIS deployments was authorised by the Security Council. Instead, all were based on bilateral agreements between the Russian president and the leaders of the various warring factions.
military forces of nations that are signatories to the Geneva and Hague conventions have minimum obligations under international humanitarian law to support humanitarian action, given the nature of the issues at stake the extent of this involvement is subject to intense debate.

Humanitarian agencies have accepted military escorts as protection for civilian aid workers and/or goods in some conflict-affected countries. UN humanitarian convoys, for instance, use military or armed escorts in seven of the 22 complex emergencies where OCHA is currently involved (OCHA, 2001). However, this practice remains highly contentious, and many other humanitarian agencies are reluctant to accept it. As far as has been regularly reported, NGOs only use armed protection on a regular basis in four of the approximately 50 conflict-affected countries worldwide: northern Iraq, Somalia, Russia (Ingushetia/Chechnya) and northern Kenya. Agencies also occasionally use armed escorts on a case-by-case basis in volatile security situations that may require rapid assessments, for example, Rwanda, or if an escort is required at a border, as between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The decision to use armed escorts, be they state forces, international peacekeepers or private military formations, is not systematised within most humanitarian organisations. In cases like Rwanda in 1994, for instance, armed protection was essential to protect the lives of aid workers; in other cases, protection is urged on agencies by the state, leaving humanitarian organisations with little choice. The kind of protection force available is also highly dependent on context. NGOs used international protection forces in northern Iraq, partly to protect themselves against the state; in northern Kenya, agencies used state armed police. In rare circumstances, NGOs and UN agencies have used private armed escorts, sometimes inadvertently when state forces were sub-contracting to private companies, as happened in Sierra Leone (Tufts, 2001). International peacekeeping protection is possible only in East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, where there are UN-mandated missions, and in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, where deployments are NATO-led.

The third main point of contact – information-sharing – may initially appear less contentious. Indeed, certain types of information should be shared between humanitarian agencies and the military to enhance the activities of both. This might include information on the general security climate, conditions in areas used by both the military and civilian agencies, such as airfields and transport routes, and general estimates about the scope and degree of the emergency. But there are also reasons for caution: there is, for instance, no guarantee that information passed on by the military gives a complete picture of any given situation, and there may well be operational reasons why a commander might seek to manipulate this information to influence agency operations. The essential political neutrality of humanitarian agencies could be compromised by providing some kinds of information to the military, especially where the force is a party to the conflict. In conflicts, information is not a neutral commodity, but may have important tactical or political value.

Military policies and doctrines

The range of peacekeeping actors and the variety of doctrines governing their actions is wide; for example, countries such as Canada, the Netherlands and Belgium emphasise 'relief operations as a core task for NATO', whereas countries such as the UK, France and the US remain more ambivalent (Byman et al., 2000). National contingents, even if deployed in multinational forces, tend to follow national doctrine, and will behave in different ways. Despite these differences, it is nevertheless possible to identify some general trends in military policies and perceptions of humanitarian activity based on a broad analysis of British, NATO and UN doctrine. The key message to emerge from interviews with policy-makers is that, first and foremost, the military works in a conflict situation in order to secure the environment. According to the UK Ministry of Defence's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), the UK's operational principles guiding engagement in humanitarian activities are:

- if at all possible, do not get involved in humanitarian aid activities;
- if UK forces must get involved, this should be in support of a lead civilian agency, where the military stays in the background; and
- only as a last resort would the military get directly involved in aid delivery, namely if the humanitarian assistance process was seen as failing.

NATO's principles are similar. While policy-makers believe that the best people to implement humanitarian operations are humanitarian agencies, not least because they understand the needs of the local population and sustainability issues, Alliance officials acknowledge that there are times when troops will be drawn into humanitarian work. In these cases, NATO doctrine lays down the conditions under which involvement will occur:

- always in collaboration with mandated organisations;
aid agencies and the military

- with a finite plan of what, why and how long humanitarian work will last, and a clear strategy for handing over operations to the relevant agency; and
- with the aim of withdrawing from humanitarian activities as soon as possible.

The approach of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to the military implementation of humanitarian projects is framed under the management of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), which provides the mechanism and procedures to bring all elements together. Again, there is a declared reluctance to engage in humanitarian work. As one key UN policy-maker pointed out in an interview in October 2001, 'there is a large [humanitarian] community out there - why would we ask the military to carry out operations that are the specialisation of others? It doesn't make sense'.

Countervailing pressures

Although in terms of policy, major peacekeeping actors may regard humanitarian activity as a secondary function for their armed forces, to be undertaken only in extreme circumstances and only for limited periods, there are a number of reasons why humanitarian activities may become increasingly attractive. These reasons are both internal to military forces themselves, and part of a wider tendency towards the politicisation of aid and relief. There appear to be two distinct points of view explaining the reasons for military interest in the humanitarian sector. The first suggests that increasing military involvement in humanitarian space is essentially unplanned and circumstantial. The second proposes a much more deliberate, intentional move by military and political policy-makers to develop humanitarian assistance provision as a core competence; humanitarian work is, for example, one of the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks' that form the mandate of the EU's projected Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

The 'circumstantial rationale'

The circumstantial rationale - most often suggested by military policy-makers - is based on the premise that the military always prefers to avoid direct involvement in the provision of humanitarian assistance. This is primarily because many national militaries already feel over-stretched in terms of budgets, human resources and materials. Getting involved in humanitarian assistance also complicates military missions, makes it difficult for troops to pull out in a timely fashion, and dilutes the war-fighting role. Finally, it involves troops in activities that they are not fully trained to carry out.

Box 4: The European Rapid Reaction Force

Western European governments formally committed to the RRF in November 2000. Once fully operational - scheduled for 2003 - the force will comprise an estimated 60,000 troops from 14 EU states. The RRF's mandate was set out in the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks'. Incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in May 1999, these tasks include:

- humanitarian missions;
- peacekeeping missions;
- crisis management, including peace-enforcement; and
- environmental protection.

Although there are concerns about its ambitious - and ambiguous - mandate, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has welcomed the RRF as a useful addition to global peacekeeping.

Against this reluctance, there is an inevitable 'pressure' to intervene for various reasons. Lieutenant-Colonel John Rollins, a British army officer seconded to NATO headquarters at Mons in Belgium, explains how 'demand-pull' and 'supply-push' pressures influenced NATO's involvement in humanitarian activities in Bosnia (Rollins, 2001). This analogy also reflects the UK's approach to 'providing military support to the civilian component' (Spence, 2001).

Demand-pull pressures revolve around perceived gaps in humanitarian coverage. Such gaps may be due to a shortage of agencies or resources on the ground. However, it is less clear who identifies these gaps, determines that they are significant enough to require a military response and then applies pressure to respond. It is also not always clear whether these gaps stem from unavoidable difficulties to do with the situation in question; rather, a lack of political support for humanitarian agencies can result in their diminished capacity to intervene. The long-term failure of donor states to invest in civil capacity has the effect of under-resourcing the humanitarian system and undermining its capacity to respond effectively. In Kosovo, for instance, UNHCR was sidelined by the EU countries and ECHO in favour of a bilateral approach. Just 3.5% of total funding from the top six EU contributors went to UNHCR. As Ed Schenkenberg puts it, in overstepping UNHCR's mandate and bypassing UNHCR's role as co-ordinator, governments unilaterally (and through NATO) started to run the humanitarian operation' (Schenkenberg, 2001).

The 'circumstantial rationale'

The 'circumstantial rationale' - most often suggested by military policy-makers - is based on the premise that the military always prefers to avoid direct involvement in the provision of humanitarian assistance. This is primarily because many national militaries already feel over-stretched in terms of budgets, human resources and materials. Getting involved in humanitarian assistance also complicates military missions, makes it difficult for troops to pull out in a timely fashion, and dilutes the war-fighting role. Finally, it involves troops in activities that they are not fully trained to carry out.
Political leaders take the decision to deploy troops in a military intervention, and in most cases decide whether to involve the military in humanitarian activities. This was the case, for example, in Albania, when the NATO Council ordered troops to construct refugee camps. According to Colonel Fiona Walthall, the Assistant Director of Peace Support Operations at the JDCC, two concurrent factors triggered this directive – an Albanian government request for assistance with the massive refugee influx, and UNHCR’s lack of response capacity at the time. On rare occasions, field commanders on the ground determine that a humanitarian response by the military is required.

Finally, humanitarian agencies sometimes directly request assistance from the military themselves. When political or military leaders decide to directly intervene in the provision of humanitarian assistance, the significance of the ‘humanitarian need’ is most often measured against its perceived potential to destabilise the political and security situation. For example, the UK’s conflict theory assumes a direct correlation between security conditions and the provision of humanitarian assistance. According to this theory, conflict can be triggered or exacerbated if aid is not reaching the civilian population, and/or is not provided impartially.

Supply–push pressures are primarily driven by requirements to ensure that the peace operation is successful, rather than considerations based on addressing actual civilian needs. These pressures trigger so-called ‘hearts and minds’ activities designed to:

- win the goodwill of the local population in order to protect forces on the ground;
- maintain staff morale; and
- generate positive reports of the operation so as to maintain support.

One such ‘hearts and minds’ operation took place during the air campaign over Afghanistan. Concurrent with the air strikes that began in October 2001, the US airdropped approximately 37,500 humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), along with propaganda leaflets. These so-called ‘humanitarian’ airdrops continued for several weeks, as part of a US pledge of $320 million in humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. In his address to the nation at the start of the air strikes, US President George W. Bush stated that the operation aimed to ensure that the oppressed people of Afghanistan (would) know the generosity of America and our allies.

Finally, a much vaguer yet frequently cited motive is a sense of moral obligation – the ‘natural desire to get involved’. This is often cited along with the point that soldiers are not ‘uncaring fighting machines’; rather, they are fellow human beings with a sense of compassion. In simplistic terms, militaries have the goodwill and humanitarian motivation to engage in these new endeavours (Tewe, 1996).

**Deliberate involvement**

The factors described above imply that military involvement in humanitarian activity is essentially ad hoc and unplanned, and not part of a deliberate strategy designed to encroach upon traditional humanitarian space. However, some academics and humanitarian agencies post a second theory about increasing military engagement in humanitarian activities. This suggests a considered and deliberate military move into humanitarian work, out of both practical necessity and as a part of the wider tendency among policy-makers to merge political–military and humanitarian activities. In practical terms, increased engagement in humanitarian work offers a new role and new funding sources for the West’s post-Cold War armed forces. Senior Oxfam staff member Nicholas Stockton suggests that large-scale redundancies and budget cuts within the British military have triggered a search for new tasks. In its draft policy document on civil–military relations in humanitarian emergencies, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SADC) notes that increased state participation in peace support operations ‘is due to a relatively stable political environment and the continued excess of military forces in most first world nations’. The SADC also suggests that participation in peace support operations, in particular disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, ‘allows for the exercise of military capability, without the diplomatic and political inconvenience of designating an enemy’ (Lang, 2001). An emphasis on humanitarian
activity may also be a useful recruiting tool; British army and navy advertisements, for instance, use images of soldiers providing humanitarian assistance to attract young recruits.

In political terms, the increased emphasis on linking military and humanitarian activities can be seen as part of a wider trend towards the politicisation of aid policy, whereby humanitarian action is increasingly used as an instrument of political intervention in violent conflicts, or as a substitute for political action in regions deemed to be peripheral to the strategic interests of the major powers: another ‘tool in the toolbox’ of conflict management (Macrae and Leader, 2000a). Thus, providing facilities for refugees or displaced people in their home regions, for instance, could be seen as a way of ‘containing’ their potentially destabilising effects elsewhere, and of minimising the political inconvenience that illegal immigration causes in Western democracies.

Conversely, the humanitarian label has increasingly been used by policy-makers to explain or justify political or military action. The lack of a common definition of key concepts such as ‘humanitarian’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘impartiality’ leaves these terms acutely vulnerable to such manipulation. In the 1980s, for instance, the US government sought to justify its war against Nicaragua on humanitarian grounds. (In this instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected the US claim to a right to intervention on the basis of human rights protection, stating that ‘the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States’ (Boyle, 2001). Other cases where the ‘humanitarian justification’ has been invoked include:

- India’s invasion of East Pakistan in support of Bangladeshi independence in 1971;
- Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and removal of the Khmer Rouge in 1978;
- Tanzania’s overthrow of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in 1979;
- US and British air strikes against targets in Iraq since February 1991; and
- NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999.

In addition, there were references in the international press to a ‘humanitarian justification’ for the military campaign in Afghanistan.

As early as the mid-1990s, humanitarian agencies were expressing concern about this increasing politicisation of aid effort. In 1994, for instance, Save the Children warned that ‘humanitarian assistance is increasingly perceived as a means to [political and security] ends rather than an urgent and inalienable right in itself. Within complex operations involving political, military, and humanitarian programmes, the danger is that the humanitarian role takes third place.

Box 5: The Brahimi report on UN peace operations

In September 2000, the UN released the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The document, dubbed the Brahimi Report after the panel’s chairman Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister and UN envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, bluntly analysed current weaknesses in the way the UN mounts and sustains peace operations, and set out some 60 recommendations for change, covering questions of doctrine, strategy and decision-making, deployment capacities, headquarters resources and information management. The report’s key conclusions were:

- peacekeeping objectives should not outrun the political will and resources necessary for the job in hand;
- the Security Council should craft and authorise clear, precise and robust mandates;
- greater resources are needed to be able to deploy sufficient, trained forces rapidly (within 30–60 days); and
- peacekeeping planning and support capacity is overloaded, and needs more personnel and the creation of a strategic planning and analysis capacity. The report recommended that a new information and strategic analysis secretariat should be created.

The Brahimi Report presents an extreme example of the merging of humanitarian aid and political agendas by suggesting a need for an overarching command-and-control structure that uses humanitarian aid as simply a ‘tool in the toolbox’ of conflict management. Thus, for instance, Brahimi refers to quick-impact projects as a means of winning hearts and minds, and persuading belligerents to ‘submit’ to a peacekeeping operation. From the humanitarian perspective, criticism of Brahimi has crystallised around the report’s definition of impartiality. For Brahimi, impartiality means fidelity to the UN Charter and to Security Council resolutions. This is not the same as the definition applied by humanitarian agencies, where impartiality means the allocation of resources on the basis of need.
In any complex emergency, humanitarian objectives as distinct from politico-military objectives need to be kept clearly in view and constantly reaffirmed to all sides (SC-UK, 1994).

When is military intervention legitimate?

Any analysis of civil-military relations from the perspective of humanitarian agencies requires a prior analysis of the decision to intervene in the first place – in legal terms the **jus ad bellum**. The key tests of the decision to intervene are that such an intervention is morally acceptable and practically useful, according to a set of specific criteria, including: 'right authority', 'right intentions', 'just cause', 'last resort', 'proportionality' and 'chances of success'.

Generally, humanitarian policy positions on military interventions fall into three broad categories (International Council on Human Rights, 2001):

1. **Force is never acceptable.** Humanitarian agencies should consistently maintain a pacifist point of view and publicly oppose military interventions of all kinds.
2. **On the fence.** Humanitarian agencies do not take a public stand against military interventions, but should never call for or endorse the use of force.
3. **Force is acceptable in certain circumstances.** NGOs have a responsibility to call for foreign intervention where it could put a stop to crimes against humanity or war crimes.

There is limited 'humanitarian consensus' around military interventions – very few humanitarian agencies have published policies, and most seem to develop specific positions on a case-by-case basis (International Council on Human Rights, 2001):

- Peaceful methods of resolution are exhausted;
- Protection by the controlling authorities has demonstrably failed;
- There is adherence to the norms of international humanitarian law;
- There is proportionality to the protection needs of the people at risk; and
- There is accountability to the UN.

A consistent factor in humanitarian debates around military interventions is the requirement that such interventions should be sanctioned by an international legal framework (as noted in Oxfam's criteria). However, although the UN Security Council provides the single most important mechanism to sanction traditional military interventions, there is significant debate around the legal and moral basis of military intervention, particularly when 'humanitarian aims' are invoked as justification. The UN Charter does not explicitly articulate a legal right to initiate a 'humanitarian' intervention. In fact, the term 'humanitarian' – much like the term 'peacekeeping' – is never used in the Charter (Wedgewood, 1999). Rather, under Article 42 the UN Security Council has the right to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security (Simons, 2000).

Box 6: Crossing language boundaries: Kosovo as a ‘humanitarian war’

Language use and misuse is at the heart of much of the confusion surrounding the civil-military debate. Participants do not share a common language, and often employ the same terms, while applying different meanings to them.

NATO’s Chief Press Officer, Jamie Shea, coined the phrases ‘humanitarian war’ and ‘humanitarian bombing’ to describe NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, on the grounds that one of the campaign’s stated aims was to end Serb violence against the province’s ethnic Albanian majority. However, although the campaign eventually succeeded in ejecting Serb forces from Kosovo, it also triggered a major humanitarian catastrophe in the form of mass refugee outflows. In addition, civilian casualties were deemed acceptable for the sake of a military strategy that demanded zero losses among NATO forces. This strategy was denounced by Amnesty International as a violation of international humanitarian law, specific to ‘the prohibition of attacks on military targets expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life “which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”’ (Amnesty International, 1999). As Jo Macrae and Nick Leader explain: ‘The use of expressions such as “humanitarian war” triggered an almost universal reaction among humanitarian agencies and established a clear “line of demarcation” in the humanitarian language debate. Most humanitarian organisations denounce the term “humanitarian war”, deeming it an unacceptable manipulation of the word “humanitarian”’ (Macrae and Leader, 2000a). In December 2000, UN Secretary-General Annan drew a clear distinction between military intervention and humanitarian intervention, saying: ‘Let’s get right away from using the term humanitarian to describe military operations’ (VOICE, 2000).
Although this article does not explicitly refer to military interventions on humanitarian grounds, it has been interpreted to confer ‘an exclusive right to authorise the use of force for the purpose of preventing or stopping gross and widespread violations of fundamental rights’ (Simons, 2000).
The difficulties humanitarian agencies face in deciding whether to take advantage of military assistance stem from fundamental issues of principle around the central ideas of impartiality, neutrality and independence in humanitarian action. To humanitarians, impartiality means that relief is given solely on the basis of need - that is, without discrimination and irrespective of other criteria such as race, religion or political affiliation. It also means that aid cannot be used to further political, military or any other objectives or aims other than addressing such human needs as food, water, medical care, shelter and protection. If political, racial, religious or other criteria are used to decide who is assisted and how, the aim of meeting human need is, inevitably, subordinated to other goals - the achievement of a particular political outcome, for instance.

Problems of principle

Humanity is the foundation of humanitarianism, and impartiality is the fundamental principle of humanitarian action. As a means to ensure impartiality, humanitarianism also needs a number of practical principles of action: neutrality (not taking sides, or being seen to take sides, in a conflict) and independence are the two most obvious ones. If humanitarian actors are not neutral players in a conflict, it will be very hard for them to act impartially. If humanitarian actors are not perceived as neutral by the parties to the conflict, their impartiality and trustworthiness will be in doubt, and their access to all people in need, as well as their own security, will be in jeopardy.

This is crucial to the civil-military debate because any association between humanitarian agencies and military forces risks compromising this impartiality. Because military forces are deployed to meet military and political aims, they are not impartial as this is understood by humanitarians. Military interventions, by their nature, are partial, political, 'highly selective and inequitable' (Slim, 2001). International military interventions are not launched on universal humanitarian principles; they are initiated for a combination of reasons including political and national interests; their aims can include such things as the resolution of a conflict, the conquering of an enemy force, the establishment of democracy, the protection of national interests or the promotion of a particular political agenda. These aims may sometimes coincide with humanitarian objectives - conquering an armed group, for instance, may afford agencies access to previously inaccessible populations in need. But peace operations do not have, as their fundamental aim, the delivery of impartial, universal humanitarian assistance.

Military involvement in relief raises the possibility that political and military objectives could influence or determine how needs are assessed, and how they are addressed. A person may be offered help not because he or she is a human being, but because he or she has particular political or religion convictions, or belongs to a 'friendly' or potentially friendly group, or lives in a strategically important place. People who are not in a favoured category would not be assisted. This is not an argument against the value and importance of ethical political action, nor does it imply that just conflict resolution and peace-building should not be pursued. It simply recognises that these tasks are different, maybe parallel, initiatives or activities, and that this distinction must be respected. As the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) puts it:

The raison d'être of humanitarian action is not the achievement of peace, and most certainly not the achievement of the enforced peace of the Security
Aid agencies and the military

As unattractive as this may seem, it is the fact that separates any Peace Operation from true humanitarian action. It is not humanitarian action when a Force Commander assures a host community with the introduction of new resources - irrespective of the needs of that community within the larger population. It is not humanitarian action when a UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator, sitting as a senior cabinet member of a Peace Operation, plans activities that complement the mission’s political objectives. It is not humanitarian action when a civilian population in need is denied assistance as a result of its location or perceived affiliations. Each of these scenarios is what the humanitarian community comes to expect when Peace Operations presume to have any humanitarian remit (SCHR, 2000).

Box 7: Existing guidelines


Critically, the draft guidelines state that military and civil defence assets supporting UN humanitarian activities will normally not be used in the direct delivery of assistance. When possible, the supported agencies will try to use military and civil defence assets in a manner that limits their visibility, and on tasks that do not call into question the neutrality or impartiality of the agency, implementing partners or other humanitarian actors. The paper sets out three core operational principles for the use of military and civil defence assets, as follows:

- Complementarity. Military and civil defence assets are means of last resort in responding to a humanitarian emergency. UN agencies will not request these assets unless they are urgently needed, and civilian assets are not available.
- Civilian Control. Military and civil defence assets employed in the support of UN humanitarian activities will be under the supervision and control of a responsible civil authority, such as the UN humanitarian coordinator.
- No Cost. Military and civil defence assets, as with all other humanitarian assistance, are provided at no cost to the affected population or the receiving state. States sending such assets should not attempt to recover these costs through other planned and programmed assistance, such as development aid. States providing military or civil defence assets must not exploit these missions to gather intelligence, or to undertake psychological operations.

Finally, these assets must be used within a limited time-frame. The humanitarian coordinator should plan for the earliest possible release of any military or civil defence asset provided to support humanitarian activities, and avoid developing any dependency on these assets once the emergency has passed (Secretariat of the Oslo Guidelines Process, 2001).

A draft proposal of principles and guidelines for the use of military and civilian defence assets to support humanitarian assistance in humanitarian emergencies - developed to influence Swiss policy - outlines the following core principles:

- Last resort. Military forces are a last resort for providing relief in humanitarian emergencies. Over-reliance on the military will severely damage the humanitarian system, and place humanitarian activities and workers at risk.
- Civilian control. Military forces should be in direct support of civilian actors. In all international humanitarian emergencies, civilian and military actors are urged to coordinate activities that impact on the delivery of assistance to victims.
Problems of utility

Both humanitarian agencies and military policy-makers agree that, in principle, the military should not normally engage in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, there are sometimes ‘exceptional circumstances’ when traditional humanitarian agencies do not have the logistics capacity to launch an immediate response. In these exceptional situations, it may seem that the military is the only body with both the available capacity and the distinctive competence to respond to humanitarian need in a timely way. In such cases, there is often a clear caveat that such a response is only filling a gap until the appropriate agencies can take over. Therefore, it should last for a very short period of time, and should be handed over immediately to civilian management as soon as this is in place.

In the last decade, there have only been three occasions when the military has directly delivered humanitarian assistance in conflict-related emergencies:

- in northern Iraq in April 1991;
- in eastern Zaire in July 1994; and
- during the Kosovo crisis in April 1999.

While military support provided in such exceptional circumstances is not ideal, it may be acceptable. However, the following factors have not been appropriately analysed:

- how often capacity and time is really an issue; and
- if the ‘exceptional’ interventions have actually resulted in significant, cost-effective assistance to the target populations.

While it may seem that the military has the capacity and the competence to initiate a ‘humanitarian’ response in exceptional circumstances, how appropriate and cost-effective is this action? Although the evaluation of the response to the Kosovo crisis gives a partial analysis of NATO’s relief work, to date there has been no significant external evaluation of military ‘humanitarian’ activities. In the absence of a considered evaluation of these efforts, it is extremely difficult to appropriately analyse the short- and long-term impacts – including benefits and harms – of military support to, or implementation of, humanitarian projects.

There is however, anecdotal evidence that raises serious and specific concerns. Aid delivered by the military can, for instance, be unsustainable and damagingly short term, with project horizons set not by the existence and persistence of need, but by deployment patterns. In the Rwandan crisis, for instance, British forces set up an army field hospital which ran for just six weeks. Once the military operation ended, the facility was closed and bulldozed, despite the fact that the region was experiencing a Shigella outbreak. A hospital established by Austrian troops in Albania during the Kosovo crisis was demolished with their departure. Military ‘humanitarian’ interventions may also not be cost-effective; the British field hospital in the Rwandan crisis, for instance, used 60 staff, whereas an equivalent NGO facility would employ perhaps one or two. The Austrian hospital cost $12m, to serve a refugee camp accommodating between two and three thousand people – equivalent to between four and six thousand dollars per head. Camp tents, which were also erected by Austrian troops, were reportedly equipped with built-in radios tuned to Radio Austria. In Albania, the cost of a small camp run by the Austrian military was DM 70m, compared with a much larger MSF facility, which cost just DM 2m. In the Rwandan crisis, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) quoted cargo rates six times higher than those of a civilian airline for the transport of supplies (Borton et al., 1996). In Afghanistan, the US spent $40m on food airdrops weighing 6,000 tonnes, equivalent to $7.50 per kilo. This compared with the WFP average of 20 cents per kilo.

Military-delivered aid and care can also be inappropriate for the conditions and for target populations. Military forces are trained and equipped to provide medical care and facilities to a predominately male, adult, healthy population – yet 80% of refugees are women and children. At the height of the 1994 Goma crisis, US forces were charged by UNHCR with supplying clean water to 700,000 refugees. However, the water purification equipment they delivered was inappropriate for the task, as it was designed for keeping small numbers of soldiers in peak condition (Oxfam, 2000). Military supplies do not contain sufficient quantities of many of the essential medicines used in emergency settings, such as oral...
rehydration salts and vaccines, and facilities are not adapted to the needs of refugees. The French army hospital in Goma in 1994, for example, provided excellent care to some refugees, but given the scale of the cholera epidemic that began soon after their arrival (some 50,000 deaths in a matter of weeks), it was an inappropriate use of resources. Instead, allocating one helicopter to transport potable water could have alleviated the supply problem caused by the congestion of roads with refugees (Terry, 2001).

US military airdrops in Afghanistan each contained one meal, consisting of shortbread, peanut butter, jam, salad and vinaigrette, when what was needed was wheat, oil and sugar for long-term cooking needs. In Kosovo, NATO set up refugee camps barracks-style, thus failing to accommodate the needs of large refugee families. The service facilities failed to meet Sphere standards (Pelton, 2000).

In some circumstances, aid delivered by the military can be not only inappropriate, but also dangerous. Using air drops to deliver aid is notoriously inaccurate; in a heavily-mined country like Afghanistan, it is likely that some supplies will end up in a mined area. This raises the risk of casualties if local people are tempted to try to retrieve them. The food packets dropped by the US in Afghanistan in late 2000 were the same colour as the cluster bombs also being delivered, raising fears that one might be mistaken for the other.
Questions need to be faced concerning the proper roles of military forces and humanitarian actors in conflict situations, and the relationship between them. The issues confronting both sides encompass fundamental principles, as well as concerns around the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of the military delivery of aid, and the security and access implications that cooperation with the military raises. Yet despite these problems, the nature of modern conflict and the evolving political and strategic agendas of the major intervening powers mean that 'cooperation' in one form or another is likely to remain a feature of the aid response, at least in key politically strategic areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan. Against this background, this chapter outlines a series of recommendations for further work, and suggests a possible framework to guide relations between humanitarian actors and the military.

Recommendations

The recommendations are three-fold:

- the civil–military debate needs to be realigned to centre first and foremost on the people in need in a humanitarian response;
- an independent evaluation of military engagement in humanitarian activities should be carried out; and
- those working in the humanitarian and the military spheres should establish agreement on a common language to describe what they do.

Realign the debate

As individuals and as members of the international community, we have an individual and collective responsibility to ensure that the needs and rights of people who are vulnerable and suffering as a result of conflict and disaster are recognized and addressed. They must be firmly located at the heart of the debate about the role of the various actors in humanitarian response, and civil–military relations in humanitarian response. Parties to this debate must be mindful of the primary responsibilities of humanitarian action, and reaffirm the key humanitarian principles. If the people who need assistance and protection become invisible, excluded or objectified as passive recipients of largesse, then the humanitarian content of this work becomes obscured, its manipulation in the service of one or another state’s political objectives becomes easier, and the principle of humanity will be dangerously undermined.

Evaluate military engagement

In addition to issues of principle, a key aspect of the civil–military debate has to do with whether aid delivered by the military is of adequate quality. To bring substance to these questions, the second recommendation is that an independent evaluation of military engagement in 'humanitarian' activities should be conducted to gather clear evidence of the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian projects implemented by the military. This evaluation should be field-based and participatory, with a particular focus on the following:

- cost–benefit analysis;
- impact, both in the short and in the longer term;
- cultural appropriateness;
- participation levels;
- implications for local economic, political or social structures; and
- sustainability.

Such an assessment would be invaluable in bringing detailed, consolidated data to the debate, in the place of the current reliance on anecdote and assumption. This would help to answer some of the key practical questions around the military delivery of aid.

Towards a framework for civil–military relations
Agree on common language
Humanitarian language quite literally defines humanitarian space. Thus, the civil-military debate requires very clear parameters and definitions of core humanitarian concepts. Without such clarity, we will be unable to take the debate forward. As Austin Davis, General Director of MSF Holland, puts it: ‘the word humanitarian needs to be carefully defined within this debate. Governments call political-military interventions “humanitarian”. But civil agencies have a different definition of the word... even to the letter of the law’. In place of this confusion, we must instead ‘agree to talk about: humanitarian intervention when referring to civilian action, military intervention when referring to military action, and to forget the fallacious slogans of military humanitarianism, and military-humanitarian interventions’ (Tanguy, 2000). Humanitarian organisations should push for a redefinition of the term ‘humanitarian’ to be incorporated into military doctrine. The Swiss government – the only government to confirm its commitment to humanitarian principles in domestic law – may provide a helpful example: ‘States and military forces must avoid the use of the term humanitarian when their actions are motivated by political or military objectives, regardless of the benefits to the population. This includes the use of feeding, shelter, and other services to legitimise the action of collect information, or enhance security’ (Lang, 2001).

There is also a need for clarity about some key concepts among civil agencies themselves. The principle of impartiality, for instance, can be interpreted in different ways by different agencies. According to the UN’s Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: ‘Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter; where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil’ (Brahimi, 2000).

This politicised rendering of the term is very far from the definition used by humanitarian agencies, where impartiality is understood as something quite different, based on a stated obligation to deliver aid on the basis of need, regardless of race, creed or nationality. There are solid reasons why the UN, as a political organisation should define impartiality in the way it does, and this is not an argument for uniformity across agencies with very different mandates and aims. But it does suggest that, where there is divergence, we need to be clear how terms are being used, and clear on the limits of their application.

Principles of engagement
In addition to the work outlined above, there is a need for clear agreement between the military and humanitarian organisations on specific ‘terms of engagement’ within a theatre. Such guidelines should, in particular, clarify the ‘exceptions to the rules’ – those exceptional and often unpredictable circumstances when it seems that military engagement in a traditionally humanitarian activity is required as the only practicable means of saving lives and/or significantly alleviating suffering.

This section describes proposed guidelines that could be used to govern relations between the military and humanitarian organisations in a conflict zone. They are premised on three fundamental principles. First, the humanitarian organisation has primacy in humanitarian work. In the first instance, humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organisations (this is one of the three guiding principles on the relationship between the humanitarian community and external military forces proposed by OCHA (2001)). Civilian implementation is always preferable to military implementation. Second, civilian humanitarian agencies can never operate under the command of the military. This violates the core principle of independence. Third, from the perspective of humanitarian agencies, the primary aims of international military peace support forces should be:

- to establish and maintain order and security;
- to protect civilians; and
- to facilitate a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

Military activities in general circumstances
It is not appropriate for the military to directly implement humanitarian activities in ‘general circumstances’, that is, when humanitarian agencies are present and capable of delivering services. General circumstances are situations where there are enough humanitarian agencies operating to address humanitarian needs. In such cases, military implementation of ‘humanitarian’ projects is unnecessary and inappropriate. Often, these are situations when national contingents that are already on the ground decide to implement quick-impact projects, such as minor repairs of schools and clinics. Such so-called hearts and minds operations are conducted for the sake of publicity and psychological benefits, such as ensuring community goodwill, maintaining positive media coverage, and sustaining staff morale. They are partial activities intended to ensure the success of the
Military operation. They are not humanitarian and should never be confused with impartial, principled humanitarian assistance based on community needs and priorities.

Military activities in exceptional circumstances
It is generally inappropriate for the military to directly implement humanitarian activities. There may, however, be rare occasions when the scale of humanitarian need is such that agencies require short-term assistance. In such exceptional circumstances, military or civil defence resources will be called for only when the following criteria are met:

- the military are means of last resort: there is no other humanitarian option, and the absence of assistance would result in unacceptable human suffering;
- there is a significant level of need, as determined by civilian agencies, including the UN;
- assets and interventions must always remain under civilian control; and
- military interventions are always clearly time-bound.

(These criteria are drawn from the Draft Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (Secretariat of the Oslo Guidelines Process, 2001).)

The use of military escorts and protection for humanitarian staff and goods
As a rule, humanitarian agencies do not use armed protection as it compromises impartiality. This is particularly the case if the protection is not provided by a ‘neutral force’. Humanitarian agencies should only use military armed protection as a last resort in extreme circumstances, and only when the following criteria are met:

- The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- Parties to the conflict – including peacekeeping forces – should not be used.
- The sovereign power or local authorities are unwilling or unable to provide a secure environment.
- The use of an armed or military escort does not compromise: the impartiality of humanitarian organisations; the security of the affected civilian population; and the longer-term capacity of the organisation to safely and effectively fulfil its mandate.

(These criteria are adapted from OCHA and ICRC guidelines on the use of armed protection (OCHA, 2001; ICRC, 1995).)

Sharing information
Certain types of information can and should be shared between humanitarian agencies and the military. However, there is a need to clearly define what types of information should and should not be shared; in many conflict situations, such information has military or political value. Information-sharing could be acceptable on the following issues:

- security conditions affecting the humanitarian situation;
- conditions in shared space (transport, aid movements and common-use airfields, for instance); and
- general estimates about the scope of the emergency.

Information should not be shared if it could, in any way, endanger communities, risk staff security or compromise the neutrality of humanitarian agencies; agencies should be guided by point four of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief:

We will never knowingly - or through negligence - allow ourselves or our employees to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

aid agencies and the military
Conclusion

Much of the analysis of the barriers to effective civil–military cooperation locates the root cause in a simple ‘lack of understanding’ between the actors, exacerbated by cultural and organisational differences. The solution typically put forward involves more joint training and information-sharing, all aimed at allowing the two sides to get to know each other better. This approach casts civil–military cooperation as primarily a technical matter. In this view, the real issues at stake are to do with practicalities and methods. All the two sides need to do is align their processes and working practices, thereby immeasurably improving assistance.

This paper argues that, far from a technical or cultural issue, civil–military cooperation in fact raises difficulties of a much more fundamental nature. Although both humanitarian and military policies suggest a number of cooperation ‘vectors’ that allow for complementary activities and in some instances cooperative efforts within the same area of operations, there are significant points of divergence.

The first centres around the principle of impartiality. Humanitarian agencies are first and foremost committed and accountable to the people they are mandated to serve. This commitment is central to all humanitarian policy debates and decisions. The core principles of humanity, impartiality and independence form the foundation of agency policy. The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation offers an uncompromising, principles-based description of a humanitarian act:

> Humanitarian work is guided by humanitarian principles. In short, humanitarian assistance is provided based on need. It is given in an impartial manner, without the expectation of payment and without any political conditions attached, other than it should reach those in need. Humanitarian providers strive to deliver this help in a neutral manner, without taking sides in disputes or political positions on the underlying issues (Lang, 2001).

The mandate of humanitarian agencies is straightforward: to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand a disaster. Humanitarian activities must be clearly impartial and independent of political and military motivations, or they violate the core principle of the humanitarian imperative, that ‘when we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such’ (Sphere, 2000). Assistance delivered by Western militaries can never be impartial in the sense that agencies understand the term, not least because it is delivered only in theatres where these forces have a presence. In other words, military involvement in humanitarian response is a possibility exclusively in areas of political or strategic interest to the interested powers. Deployments are, in fact, relatively few: UN and NATO peacekeeping missions are currently present in less than a third of the 50 or so countries in conflict in the world (see Annex 1). Humanitarian agencies, by comparison, are active in most countries in conflict.

The second issue is to do with the questionable effectiveness of assistance as delivered by the military. There is simply not enough evidence to support the argument that military involvement in humanitarian activity works – that it is appropriate, cost-effective, even necessary. While agencies and militaries may agree that such assistance should be contemplated only in exceptional circumstances, this does not get us far since it is unclear how such circumstances are to be identified. It is also not safe to assume that the existence of such ‘exceptional circumstances’ in a given emergency is not itself a deliberate result of policy and a failure to adequately support humani-
Aid agencies and the military

...
## Annex 1

### Major conflicts worldwide since 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Status/Intensity</th>
<th>States directly involved</th>
<th>Conflict type</th>
<th>Deaths (by end 1999)</th>
<th>Deaths in 2000 (blank if unknown)</th>
<th>Current peacekeeping presence (as of August 2001)</th>
<th>Past peacekeeping presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Ongoing (high)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>&gt;3,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNGOMAP (1988-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ongoing (isporadic)</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Civil war (Islamic militants)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>&gt;1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Ongoing (high)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Civil war (UNITA)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>&gt;1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>MONUA (1997-99) UNAVEM I (1988-91) UNAVEM II (1991-95) UNAVEM III (1995-97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Suspended 1997</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Nagorno-Karabakh)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Suspended 1992</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Chittagong Hills)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Suspended 1995</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Serbs, Croats, Muslims)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNMIBH SFOR (NATO) UNPROFOR (1992-95)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Ongoing (medium)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Tutsi vs Hutus)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Approx 1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Suspended 1997</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Civil war (Kmer Rouge)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNAMIC (1991-92) UNMOP (1992-93)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Ended 1994 (isporadic)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNASOG (1990-94)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Repressed 1998</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Ethnic violence (Uighurs, Kazakhs)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Ongoing (medium)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Civil war (insurgency and druglords)</td>
<td>&gt;40,000</td>
<td>&gt;1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing (isporadic)</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Political (Anjouan)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Suspended (temporal) 1999</td>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ONUC (1960-64)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start</td>
<td>Status/Intensity</td>
<td>States directly involved</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Deaths (by end 1999)</td>
<td>Deaths in 2000 (blank if unknown)</td>
<td>Current peacekeeping presence (as at August 2001)</td>
<td>Past peacekeeping presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Ongoing (non-violent)</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Civil violence</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UNFICYP (1964–present)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Suspended 1974</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>DOMREP (1965–66)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Suspended 1995</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Civil violence</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ONUSA (1991–95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>UNOMIG/CIS</td>
<td>CIS (July 1992–present)</td>
<td>CIS (July 1992–present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Suspended 1995</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>MINUGUA (Jan.–May 1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Internal violence (military coup)</td>
<td>Over 1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Suspended 1999</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Civil war (coup attempt)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ECOMOG (1998–99)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Ongoing (medium)</td>
<td>India/Pakistan</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Kashmiris)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>&gt;200</td>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>UNMOGIP (1965–86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Suspended 1999</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Ethnic violence (East Timor independence)</td>
<td>&gt;2,000</td>
<td>100–300</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Suspended 1998</td>
<td>Iraq/Iran</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Kurd)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>UNIKOM (1998–91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Israel/Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>1974–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Ongoing (low)</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
<td>Arab Palestinians vs PLO</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>UNTSO (since 1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Suspended 2000</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Civil war (military coup)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Promote autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UNMIK (June 1999–present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>International violence (PLO factions)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UNOGIL (1958)</td>
<td>UNIFIL (since 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Suspended 2000</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Civil violence (elections)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>SADC (1998)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start</td>
<td>Status/</td>
<td>States directly involved</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Deaths (by end 1999)</td>
<td>Deaths in 2000 (blank if unknown)</td>
<td>Current peacekeeping presence (as at August 2001)</td>
<td>Past peacekeeping presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Sporadic (1997)</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Suspended 1997</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Ethnic violence (Trans-Dniester)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>CIS (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Suspended 1989</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Colonial war (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>MINURSO (since 1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Resolved 1989</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ONUMG (1992-94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Ongoing (low)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Karen, Shan, others)</td>
<td>1948-50: 8,000 1981-88: 5,000-8,000</td>
<td>50-200</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Resolved 1990</td>
<td>Nambia</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNTAG (1989-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing (low)</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Civil violence (UPF 'People's war')</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Suspended 1997</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Ethnic violence (Azawad and Toumbou)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing (low)</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Ethnic (Delta and northern regions)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Repressed 1998</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Ethnic (Sindhis, Mohajirs)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>UNIPOM (1965-66) UNMOGIP (since 1948)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Suspended 1997</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Bougainville)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNSF (1962-63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Repressed 1997</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Civil violence (Sendero Luminoso)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Chechen separatists)</td>
<td>40,000- 70,000</td>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Ethnic violence (Casamance)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ongoing (medium)</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Civil/ethnic warfare (RUF/Mende)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNAMSIL UNOMSL (1998-99)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNOSOM I UNOSOM II (1992-93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Ongoing (high)</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Tamil)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>&gt;4,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Ongoing (high)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Islamic vs African)</td>
<td>37,000- 40,000</td>
<td>&gt;1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Ongoing (low)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Ethnic war (Kurds)</td>
<td>&gt;30,000</td>
<td>200-400</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start</td>
<td>Status/ intensity</td>
<td>States directly involved</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Deaths (by end 1999)</td>
<td>Deaths in 2000 (blank if unknown)</td>
<td>Current peacekeeping presence (as at August 2001)</td>
<td>Post peacekeeping presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Ethnic violence (Lango and Acholi)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Inter-state violence</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UNNYOM (1963-64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Ethnic violence</td>
<td>Over 2,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data is based on research compiled by Monty G. Marshall, Director, Center for Systemic Peace, (http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm), and information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI: http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/majorarmedconflicts.html). Additional sources are: UNDPKO (www.un.org/depts/DPKO); the University of Maryland Development and Conflict Management website (www.bsos.umd.edu/cid.cm); Recent Peace Agreements and Cease-Fires, INCORE, February 2001 (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk); and Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-1999 (http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/cspframe.htm).
Annex 2
Initiatives in civil–military relations

The NGO Military Contact Group
The NGO Military Contact Group (NMCG) was established on the joint recommendation of NGO and military delegates, and was mandated to take forward initiatives conducive to developing a greater understanding between both sectors. Currently, the group’s membership comprises two NGO representatives—one from ActionAid and one from Oxfam—one military representative, and a representative from the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), part of the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID). Since it was established, the NMCG has implemented several initiatives aimed at facilitating a wider dialogue between military and humanitarian actors. These include:

- The ‘Bandundo Workshop’—a joint training event exploring military and NGO planning processes in response to humanitarian crises in complex emergencies;
- a three-month military attachment to ActionAid;
- NGO participation in military-led conferences and courses and
- military participation in courses run by the international NGO RedR.

Cranfield University Disaster Management Centre
The Disaster Management MSc at Cranfield University in the UK covers both complex emergencies and natural disasters. Modules include: training in emergencies, including security training; logistics; security and communications; and the essentials of humanitarian practice. The course covers: hazards, disasters, research skills, complex emergencies, urban risk management, human-made disasters and public health consequences.

Cranfield also runs international and national courses (over five weeks, or an intensive one-week course) that include complex emergency modules. These courses are attended by government officials, as well as representatives of aid agencies and the military. Cranfield is also negotiating with the UN to run pre-mission conflict training at both strategic and operational levels. This training would be funded by DFID’s Conflict Prevention Fund.

The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
The Center of Excellence is a partnership of the US Pacific Command, the Pacific Regional Medical Command, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the University of Hawaii. It is the only World Health Organisation-designated Collaborating Centre for humanitarian civil–military cooperation. The Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building programme runs a series of seminars, symposia and exercises to facilitate multinational dialogue on the nature of peace operations. Representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the US army have participated.

Wilton Park conferences
In April 2001, the Wilton Park centre in the UK ran a conference on ‘The Role of the Military in Complex Emergencies’ (see www.wiltonpark.co.uk). The conference, which covered issues such as relations between NGOs and governments, NGO coordination, lessons from Kosovo and the future of civil–military relations, was attended by representatives of the British government, NGOs, the ICRC, the British military and academics. In October–November 2002, a further conference is scheduled on ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction: Lessons Learnt and Best Practice’, covering the division of responsibilities between civilians and armed forces.
The UK Ministry of Defence

Staff courses
The British military has a number of relevant courses. The advanced one-year course at Major/Lieutenant-Colonel level has a two-week segment covering peace support operations. The first week comprises talks from a range of speakers, including NGO and UN agency personnel. The second week includes a mapping exercise, in which NGO staff participate. The course is attended by officers from all three service branches. The Higher Command and Staff Course, aimed at officers of the rank of Colonel, includes several civilian personnel from other government departments. NGO personnel have not yet attended, but are welcome to do so. The Joint Operations Planning Course trains officers about to join the Permanent Joint Headquarters or the Joint Force Headquarters. The course includes a peace support operations module, with contributions from an NGO representative, who also takes part in a mapping exercise.

Operational Training and Advisory Groups
The Operational Training and Advisory Groups (OPTAG) is responsible for overseeing the pre-deployment training of military units, usually includes a session on NGOs. OPTAG also runs courses for UN Military Observers, and has run a course for civilian OSCE observers.

The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) is attempting to develop a more integrated approach to training for peace operations that involves civilians right from the start. A five-phase strategy has been developed.

- Phase one involves running seminars and conferences.
- Phase two involves funding places on existing Ministry of Defence courses for representatives from the UN, from UN troop-contributing countries and from NGOs.
- Phase three involves making existing courses more suitable for civilian participation.
- Phase four involves developing bespoke courses for the UN and NGO staff.
- The UK is running a Mission Headquarters Orientation Programme course in September 2002. This two-week course is aimed at military, police or civilian middle and senior managers who may form part of a UN mission headquarters.

British Military Advisory and Training Teams
British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT) work closely with a number of African peacekeeping training centres, for example in Kenya and Ghana, and with a centre in the Czech Republic aimed at the Caucasus region. BMATTs assist these centres in running their own courses and exercises.
References


aid agencies and the military


Interviews

Chris Coleman
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York, U.S.

Major David Couzens
Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), Shrivenham, Wiltshire, U.K.

Austen Davis
General Director, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF–Holland), Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Andrew Harper
Formerly Manager, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Joint Operations Center, East Timor.

Sarah Longford
World Food Programme, Rome, Italy.

Major Ross Nichols
Cranfield University Disaster Management Centre, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, U.K.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Rollins
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium.

Craig Sanders
UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland.

Ed Schenkenberg von Meirop
Director, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Geneva, Switzerland.

Hugo Slim
Centre for Development and Emergency Practice (CEN DEP), Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, U.K.

Nicholas Stockton
Oxfam, Oxford, U.K.

Colonel Fiona Walthall
Assistant Director, Peace Support Operations, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), Shrivenham, Wiltshire, U.K.

Roger Yates
Emergencies Director, ActionAid, London, U.K.
Network Papers

Network Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members or contributing specialists.

1. MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: A Data Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population Movements by T. Dusauchot (1994)
3. An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by M. Duffield (1994)
5. Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold War Era: Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs by K. Rupesinghe (1994)
7. Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief ed. J. Borton (1994)
14. The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects by J. Bennett (1996)
30. Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999)
34. NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Accountability and Learning by F. Gurunwald, V. de Geoffrey & S. Lister (2000)

Good Practice Reviews

Good Practice Reviews are commissioned ‘state of the art’ reviews on different sectors or activities within the relief and rehabilitation field. Prepared by recognised specialists, and subject to peer review, they are produced in a format that is readily accessible to field-based personnel.

4. Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)
Background

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) was established by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 1994 under the name Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN). It is run as part of ODI’s Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG).

Purpose

To stimulate critical analysis, advance the professional learning and development of those engaged in and around humanitarian action, and improve practice.

Objectives

To provide relevant and useable analysis and guidance for humanitarian practice, as well as summary information on relevant policy and institutional developments in the humanitarian sector.

Activities

- **Publishing in three formats**: Good Practice Reviews (one per year), Network Papers (four to six per year) and Humanitarian Exchange (two per year). All materials are produced in English and French.
- **Operating a resource website**: this is one of the key reference sites for humanitarian actors.
- **Collaborating with international ‘partner’ networks**: this increases the reach of the HPN, and brings mutual benefit to the participating networks.
- **Holding occasional seminars on topical issues**: these bring together practitioners, policy-makers and analysts.

HPN target audience

Individuals and organisations actively engaged in humanitarian action. Also those involved in the improvement of performance at international, national and local level – in particular mid-level operational managers, staff in policy departments, and trainers.

While a project and Network with its own identity, the HPN exists within the Humanitarian Policy Group at the ODI. This not only ensures extended networking and dissemination opportunities, but also positions the HPN in a wider ‘centre of excellence’ which enhances the impact of the HPN’s work.

Funding

The HPG is supported by the British Red Cross, CARE, DANIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland, DFID, ECHO, Oxfam, MFA Netherlands, MSF, OCHA, SCF(UK), SIDA, UNDP, USAID and the WFP.