Chapter Six

OVERVIEW OF THE RELIEF COMMUNITY

The first step toward better coordination is for the military to gain a better understanding of relief agencies. The relief community is not monolithic. The actors vary tremendously in their capabilities, size, and attitudes, with considerable implications for cooperation with the U.S. military and for the success of the overall relief effort. Major actors include the United Nations family, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs. Understanding these various players is a precondition to coordinating their activities. This chapter identifies major actors within the relief community and categorizes NGOs in a manner that will help the U.S. military understand their various missions and capabilities.

UNITED NATIONS FAMILY

The United Nations is a family of related organizations that includes six principal organs, numerous programs, and specialized agencies. Despite efforts at reform, coordination across these organizations remains poor.

Principal Organs

The United Nations has six principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Three of these organs are especially important during humanitarian interventions: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat.

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. It expresses its will in resolutions, which must have concurrence (assent or abstention) from all five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States). The Security Council usually defines the mandates for peace operations by its resolutions. However, member states often act unilaterally or as part of an alliance without approval from the Security Council, as in Operation Allied Force.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has broad responsibility to coordinate the economic and social work of the entire UN family. It usually meets in plenum once annually, alternating between New York and Geneva. It routinely consults with NGOs whose work falls under its competence. Currently about 1,500 NGOs hold consultative status with the Council. It sorts these NGOs in three categories: Category I are routinely consulted; Category II have specialized expertise; and Category III are consulted on an ad hoc basis.

The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General, includes two entities that are important for relief operations: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). DPKO provides direction and logistic support to UN-controlled peace operations. OCHA is intended to strengthen coordination among UN agencies that respond to emergencies. The head of OCHA is simultaneously the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the Emergency Relief Coordinator for all specialized agencies.

Programs and Specialized Agencies

In addition to the principal organs, the UN has a wide variety of programs and specialized agencies,[1] most falling under cognizance of

[1]A list of some of the major programs and agencies would include United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Volunteers (UNV); United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS); United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the near East (UNRWA); United Nations University (UNU); World Food Programme (WFP); United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR); United Nations Centre for

the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. They are not subordinated to the Secretariat and therefore need not accept direction from the Secretary-General. They include several organizations that play important roles in relief operations, described below.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) works on behalf of refugees to secure their protection, provide assistance to them, and seek durable solutions to their problems. It can serve as a lead UN agency, especially in the initial phase of a humanitarian crisis. These solutions might include repatriation, asylum in the country where refugees have fled, or resettlement in a third country. UNHCR maintains an office in New York, but its headquarters is in Geneva. It is advised by a large Executive Committee that meets annually and accepts direction from the General Assembly and ECOSOC. UNHCR has an annual budget of approximately $1.2 billion, derived almost exclusively from voluntary contributions. It currently has over 5,000 employees working in 122 countries, but it works primarily through about 450 NGOs.

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the world's largest multilateral provider of food aid. In contrast to the UNHCR, WFP is focused on logistics and food delivery and does not serve as a lead agency. WFP headquarters is in Rome and its current director is an American with experience in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. A committee, half appointed by ECOSOC and half by the Food and Agricultural Organization, governs WFP. Most aid is donated in kind by member states with U.S. agricultural surplus playing a large role. During 1997, WFP delivered 2.7 million tons of food in 84 countries. To deliver this aid, WFP charters commercial carriers on a large scale.

Human Settlements (Habitat); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP); United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM); International Labour Organization (ILO); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); World Health Organization (WHO); World Bank Group; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Universal Postal Union (UPU); International Telecommunication Union (ITU); World Meteorological Organization (WMO); International Maritime Organization (IMO); World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and World Trade Organization (WTO).

The World Health Organization (WHO) is headquartered in Geneva and gives guidance in health matters and works to strengthen government health programs. An assembly that includes all member states of the United Nations governs it. Its annual budget is about $800 million.

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations promotes agricultural development and helps countries provide for emergency relief. It has headquarters in Rome and is governed by a biennial conference of member states. It administers approximately $2 billion annually, received as voluntary contributions from government and private donors.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) promotes children's rights and supports programs that increase their well-being. It reports to the General Assembly through ECOSOC. It has an annual budget of approximately $0.9 billion, derived from voluntary contributions. It employs about 6,200 persons in 133 countries and has several main offices.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funds programs for sustainable development and coordinates technical assistance. UNDP has its headquarters in New York and 132 offices worldwide. It is governed by an Executive Board, which represents developed and developing countries. It concentrates its efforts in the world's poorest countries. It has an annual budget of approximately $700 million from voluntary contributions and administers another $1.4 billion annually from a variety of special funds.

RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement straddles the gap between international organizations and NGOs. It is a private organization independent of all international organizations and governments, yet it has official status through treaty, agreement, and usage. The movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and affiliated national societies.

International Committee of the Red Cross

The ICRC, the most important partner for the military in overseas humanitarian crises, is quite distinct from NGOs and UN agencies and is effectively in a class by itself as a relief provider. The ICRC has an international mandate to promote compliance with humanitarian law and to help victims of conflict. It receives funding from many governments, especially the U.S. government, and from nationally based Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. It administers an annual budget of about $550 million. It has about 650 personnel in its Geneva headquarters and about 7,800 personnel worldwide, the overwhelming majority of them locally hired. It maintains a permanent presence in more than 50 countries.

The ICRC is formally tasked by the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949, which concern humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilian victims of conflict. To carry out its tasks, the ICRC must have freedom of movement within areas of armed conflict and across lines of confrontation. It ensures this freedom by being completely independent, impartial, and neutral. The ICRC reminds authorities involved in armed conflict of their obligations under international law to observe certain rules of conduct. In addition to its monitoring functions, the ICRC distributes relief supplies, provides emergency treatment, and administers care for the disabled.

To accomplish its mandate, the ICRC must be able to cross lines of confrontation and move freely throughout areas of conflict. It cannot expect to have this access unless belligerents are persuaded that the ICRC is neutral and impartial. *Any* indication that the ICRC may have intentionally or even inadvertently aided one side in a preferential fashion may destroy this reputation and serve as a pretext to limit its access. Understandably, the ICRC is anxious to preserve an unblemished record for neutrality and impartiality.

International Federation

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies promotes affiliated national societies and gives unity to the movement. It is governed by a General Assembly of all National Societies that meets biannually.

National Societies

National Societies exist in most of the countries of the world. They focus on the well-being of their specific nations. The American Red Cross has an International Services Department with an annual budget of $20–$30 million that channels relief through the ICRC and the International Federation.

NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

NGOs are voluntary associations independent of government control that seek to realize human rights and to provide humanitarian assistance according to need. By one conservative estimate, there are more than 26,000 NGOs that operate in more than one country, and several million more exist inside national borders.[2] Just about anybody anywhere in the world can establish an NGO if he pleases. As a result, there are thousands of NGOs and their composition fluctuates constantly. For example, 18,000 NGOs attended a parallel forum to the Rio Conference on the environment, and 1,400 were formally registered with the conference itself. NGOs vary widely in terms of their capabilities, professionalism, and willingness to cooperate with military forces, including the U.S. military. Successful coordination requires understanding these differences.

UN agencies and national governments often rely on NGOs as integral parts of their relief and development efforts. The European Union channels more than half of its aid through NGOs. Similarly, the WFP and the UNHCR rely heavily on NGOs to run refugee camps, deliver food, and otherwise conduct essential missions. By some measures, NGOs have surpassed the World Bank in dispersing money.[3]

The skills and size of NGO personnel vary tremendously.[4] There are NGOs with a staff of thousands that supplement a core of competi-

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[2]"The Non-Governmental Order" (1999), p. 21.

[3]"Sins of the Secular Missionaries" (2000), p. 25.

[4]Undifferentiated generalizations about NGOs are not very useful because the community is so diverse. CARE and a local civic organization are both "NGOs," just as the U.S. armed forces and, say, the Army of Luxembourg (one light infantry battalion) are both "militaries."

tively salaried professionals with unpaid volunteers, and NGOs that literally consist of one individual and a few friends. The four largest receivers of U.S. government funding—Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children, and World Vision—are skilled, dedicated, and able to participate in a wide range of humanitarian relief activities. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam, and several other international NGOs are highly capable and competent. At the opposite extreme are small organizations composed largely of relief amateurs, which may spring up overnight. In Rwanda, for example, a woman named Ruth formed an organization aptly entitled "Ruth Cares"—a single individual with no appreciable skills other than a desire to help. Often these groups involve concerned citizens in the United States. As another example, the Defense Department once helped some upstate New York women send sewing materials to South Africa to support a sewing club.

NGOs also vary by issue area, specialization, geographic coverage, and degree of institutionalization:

- NGOs focus on a wide range of issues, including natural disasters, refugees, underdevelopment, the environment, and child labor. Some NGOs define themselves primarily by an issue (the environment, women's affairs, children's rights, health, agriculture, animal rights, political prisoners, famine relief, recovery of avalanche victims, and so on), others by ideology (Third World solidarity, pacifism, etc.), by sympathy for a specific country, ethnic group, or region (e.g., immigrants from Central American countries helping victims of natural disasters in those countries), or by religious charity (Christian, Jewish, Islamic, etc.).
- Some NGOs consist of members of one profession only (e.g., health professionals or members of one medical specialty such as dentists or ophthalmologists) who may either work for that organization full time or donate a few weeks of pro bono work each year to go on a mission. Other NGO staff members have no skills as such but concentrate on collecting used clothing, food items, and other donations.
- NGOs may represent their club, their city, their locality, their ethnic group, their country, their continent, or their religion; or they may simply be international. They can be affiliated with

their local, state, or national government, their church, or some other organization, or they can eschew affiliations.

- NGOs can be designed as permanent organizations or be dedicated to one conflict only, such as the organizations that sprang up in response to the Bosnian conflict.

The above variables do not necessarily correlate with the success and prestige of an organization. Staid organizations such as the European Catholic monolith Caritas number among the big players, but organizations that use unconventional and sometimes drastic means of protest, such as Greenpeace, or that take a decidedly radical political stance, such as Médecins Sans Frontières also enjoy widespread public support and respect.

As a general rule, we can expect the financially more powerful, more reputable organizations with good media ties and an experienced staff to be more important in any given locale, but there are important exceptions. In emergency situations, size, experience, and reputation are not the only predictors of value. An obscure missionary organization may find itself in possession of the only functioning aircraft for a critical 48-hour period; a hitherto unknown group running a remote clinic might have the only available cartons of vaccine; a small partisan organization with a friendly relationship to a local warlord might be the only quick source of information about events in a particular region or safety guarantees to access it.

NGOs also vary widely in the types of aid they provide. Some are concerned with immediate assistance, some with long-term development, and some address both areas. In recent years, several of the larger NGOs appear to be devoting greater resources to immediate assistance.[5] Some NGOs specialize by region or by functional area. The Catholic Medical Mission Board, for example, provides emergency and long-term health care worldwide, while the American Refugee Committee helps care for and train refugees. Medical Care Development, Volunteers in Technical Assistance, and Africare all focus their relief efforts on Africa, while other NGOs are active in several regions or worldwide. In the developing world, some NGOs

[5]Within major NGOs, individuals concentrating on short-term relief are often gaining more influence and resources than those concentrating on long-term development.

are government-run and may be highly politicized. In Kosovo, for example, the Albanian government ran an NGO that furthered its own policies in the months preceding the 1999 NATO air campaign.

Although a small number of well-established NGOs contribute most of the overall effort, hundreds of NGOs may operate in a region and cannot be safely ignored. Personnel from small NGOs may require disproportionate attention from the military if they attempt to cross lines of confrontation or operate in areas of intense conflict. Moreover, a small NGO may have an influential domestic constituency to whom it can plead its case, enabling it to exert political influence on the overall relief operation.

NGOs also differ widely in their ability and willingness to cooperate with the military. In general, European NGOs tend to avoid close cooperation, while U.S. NGOs are more amenable. But even well-established U.S.-based NGOs differ in the degree to which they will openly associate with the U.S. military. Some welcome closer ties; others fear that their impartiality might be compromised. Some religiously affiliated NGOs eschew the use of force and regard the military with suspicion. For example, Quaker and Mennonite NGOs have a long tradition of nonviolence and are highly reluctant to endorse any use of force.

Several large NGOs are trying to improve cooperation with the military. For example, CARE and World Vision have hired former military officers to facilitate better cooperation. In ideological terms, the end of the Cold War has made such cooperation more palatable. While the Cold War was still in progress, many NGOs hesitated to cooperate with the U.S. military because it stood on one side of an ideological divide. More importantly, NGOs have grown increasingly concerned about security for their personnel in such places as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, making them more welcoming of security that the military can provide.

CATEGORIZING NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

It would be practically impossible to coordinate with all NGOs during an emergency if each demanded the same amount of attention. Coordination becomes a more manageable problem if NGOs are categorized in a useful way, enabling the military to determine which

NGOs are most likely to cooperate and which have the most to offer in any particular operation. We suggest the following taxonomy, which will enable the military to concentrate its resources accordingly:

- Core-Team: highly competent, broadly capable, and predisposed to cooperate with the military.
- Core-Individual: highly competent and broadly capable, but less eager to cooperate with the military.
- Specialized: highly competent and capable in select functional areas.
- Advocacy: dedicated to promoting human rights but not normally providers of material assistance.
- Minor: competent but having less capability than the core-team.

Core-Team

The core-team NGOs devote appreciable portions of their resources to immediate relief of suffering. Most of them receive substantial support from the U.S. government, including grants, contracts, and in-kind transfers. Most of them work closely with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID to coordinate the U.S. response to an emergency, both in Washington and in the field. During emergencies, OFDA may invite these organizations to send representatives to its operations center. Several of these NGOs send representatives to participate in conferences, seminars, and exercises sponsored by the military. During interviews, officers from these organizations expressed willingness to cooperate more closely with the military.

Taking as a threshold a gross annual revenue of $30 million or more,[6] the following organizations fall into this group: Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Africare, American Jewish

[6]Total annual revenue as reported in Geoghegan and Allen (1997). In the highly competitive world of NGOs, high revenue generally indicates strong capability. It implies that an NGO has maintained a level of performance over time that attracts donors, including in most cases the U.S. government.

World Service (AJWS), American Red Cross (International Services Department), Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Service (CWS), International Aid, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps International (MCI), Save the Children (U.S. chapter), United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), and World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD).

Core-Individual

These organizations are international and most of their assets are located outside the United States. Although they often receive funding from the U.S. government, they display highly independent attitudes. They may reject support from the military or criticize the military in strong terms, even while accepting its support. Their criticism might include allegations that the military is obsessed with self-protection, insensitive to cultural differences, and disruptive to already established patterns of aid. It might also include allegations that the military is taking sides unnecessarily or being used to pursue political goals that will not allay or might exacerbate the conflict.

Two international relief organizations falling into this group are Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam). Both organizations receive U.S. government aid but strive to maintain their distance from the U.S. government's agenda. Médecins Sans Frontières was founded in 1971 by French doctors who wanted to provide medical assistance during emergencies completely independent of political, religious, or economic considerations. It provides not only medical care and training but also limited humanitarian assistance of other kinds. Its medical personnel are highly skilled in emergency medical care, immunization, sanitation, and basic hygiene. In addition, NGOs may speak out against violations of human rights they observe during their work. Oxfam was founded in England during 1942 to address suffering caused by the war. It provides emergency relief and also carries out programs to promote long-term development.

Core-individual organizations are not opposed to all coordination with the military, but their ideals and preferences often make planning and sustained coordination more difficult. These NGOs at times will accept and even request U.S. military assistance. As insti-

tutions, however, they will try to avoid open identification with the United States, particularly the U.S. military. As one MSF official noted:

> We try as much as we can to differentiate from any military that is present. The image of cooperating with the Air Force is scary for us. This would mean recognizing that we are part of the conflict, and it would send a confusing message to the populations we are trying to help.

As with all NGOs, the particular response of a core–individual NGO will be shaped by local circumstances and the individuals involved.

Government support, even something as limited as accepting stipends to pay for conference attendance, usually provokes much agonizing and soul-searching among NGO officials. Offers of significant funding can often be turned down on the chance that it might make the organization appear partisan or dependent. MSF policy requires at least half of all funds to come from private sources, and "has shied away from French government funding."[7] Yet these requirements are often honored more in the breach. Oxfam received roughly a quarter of its 1998 budget from the British government and the EU; MSF received 46 percent from various governments.[8]

Specialized

Some NGOs lack the broad capabilities of the core organizations but are highly competent and capable in functional areas, such as emergency medicine. Awareness of their capabilities is vital, as they can be useful in certain kinds of crises. Often, they are more important than core NGOs when a crisis falls into their area of specialty.

Such organizations include Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Voluntary Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), Action Against Hunger, African-American Institute (AAI), American Refugee Committee (ARC), The Brother's Brother Foundation (BBF), Catholic Medical Mission Board (CMMB),

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[7] Brauman and Tanguy (1998).

[8] "Sins of the Secular Missionaries" (2000), p. 25.

Childreach, Christian Children's Fund (CCF), Direct Relief International, Food for the Hungry International (FHI), Heifer Project International (HPI), MAP International, Medical Care Development (MCD), Winrock International, World Relief Corporation, and the U.S. Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).

ACDI/VOCA provides technical expertise to business and government agencies. Action Against Hunger is the U.S. arm of an international organization known in France as *Action Contre la Faim* that specializes in disaster relief. With strong support from the U.S. government, AAI conducts exchange, information, and conference programs in Africa. ARC works to ensure survival of refugees and displaced persons. BBF promotes international health and education by distributing donated resources. CMMB provides emergency health care and conducts longer-term programs to make health care available to impoverished people. Childreach strives to assist needy children through sponsorship. CCF works to protect children and promote their development. Direct Relief International provides emergency medical supplies and shelter to victims of disaster and also conducts training for medical personnel. FHI provides food and material aid for disaster victims. HPI specializes in providing income-producing livestock. MAP International provides emergency medical care and distributes medical supplies. MCD designs and implements programs to provide emergency relief and promote public health. Winrock International works to increase agricultural productivity. World Relief Corporation provides disaster relief on behalf of evangelical churches. YMCA focuses on education and vocational training.

Advocacy

Advocacy organizations promote human rights or other goals but do not normally provide material assistance. Examples include Amnesty International, Immigration and Refugee Services of America (IRSA), International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Refugees International (RI), United States Catholic Conference (USCC), and United States Committee for Refugees (USCR).

Amnesty International advocates observance of human rights as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. IRSA promotes fair and humane public policy concerning people in migration. ICRW raises awareness of women's contribution to development. PHR uses forensic science to investigate violations of human rights. RI seeks to bring the plight of refugees to the world's attention. USCC advocates policies to address the needs of migrants and refugees. USCR defends the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons.

Although advocacy organizations often are of little immediate utility during relief operations, the military cannot afford to ignore their needs or activities. These agencies may play a key role in shaping U.S. political objectives and domestic opinion on the efficacy of the relief effort. Moreover, they often have strong grassroots components to gain political support for their objectives.

Minor

Minor organizations may or may not be competent in providing relief. They range from organizations with substantial annual revenues ($5–$30 million), which can make strong contributions in certain fields, to much smaller organizations, which can make only small contributions. Most NGOs fall into this category. Although minor organizations contribute little materially when compared with core and specialized NGOs, they can play important roles in a particular country or during a particular crisis. Some have political connections or may create problems on the ground because of their activities. Because of their small size, NGOs in this category may not be well known, even to specialists, prior to a particular crisis.

The above typology is not exact and members in each category vary considerably by country and region. Nevertheless, understanding the different capacities and inclinations of NGOs is useful in helping the military employ its scarce resources. The discussion in subsequent chapters draws on this typology when discussing problems and noting possible solutions.

Chapter Eight

COORDINATION STRUCTURES AND THEIR LIMITS

The large number of disparate actors who may react independently or autonomously make better military coordination with the relief community difficult. Compounding this difficulty is a lack of predictable, dependable control arrangements at the operational level across the United Nations family of organizations and among NGOs. Outside the relief community, the most influential actors create coordination structures, which vary from one operation to another. These may be broadly characterized as host-nation lead, United Nations lead, alliance or coalition lead, and lead country. In addition, the Department of Defense currently funds Centers of Excellence that seek to promote better coordination through a range of initiatives.[1] These structures, however, are often of only limited utility in bridging the gap between international and donor-state objectives and the relief effort on the ground.

The number of disparate actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance complicate efforts to improve coordination. Actors include the relief community outlined in Chapter Six, donor countries, host countries, and regional organizations, displayed graphically in Figure 8.1. At times, everyone and no one may seem to be in charge. Military control arrangements can be highly complex and home governments may micromanage their deployed forces. As a result, the military may not receive entirely clear missions and be

[1]Comments on the Center of Excellence in this chapter draw on the experience of the most established center, which is affiliated with USPACOM. A center is also being established by USSOUTHCOM as of this writing.



NOTE: OCHA = Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; WFP = World Food Programme.

Figure 8.1—Many Disparate Actors

compelled to improvise, or its mission may change in disconcerting ways.

The major donor countries usually include the United States, European countries (individually and through the European Union), and Japan. These countries may attend donors' conferences, often sponsored or promoted by the United States, where they pledge support to particular efforts. They may contribute without qualification or they may require that their contributions go toward particular geographic or functional areas. The donors may belong to a regional organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which is directly involved in operations. They may contribute to funding mechanisms such as the World Bank or they may fund individual projects through their national equivalents of USAID. Important

donors have bilateral arrangements with host countries, which affect their support and conflict with broader cooperation.

The relief community includes disparate actors that range from the influential UNHCR to small NGOs, some created just to address the particular crisis. Each of these actors makes decisions independently or autonomously. Particularly during the initial phase of a humanitarian crisis, each may pursue its own course of action, subject only to conditions that donors and host countries may impose.

INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Within the U.S. government, complex contingencies may be hampered by a tardy or ineffective interagency process.[2] The departments and agencies of government—especially State, Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency—must all work together, often in unaccustomed ways.

Planning would clearly help, but only the military is likely to hold up its end. In fact, PDD-56 prescribes development of a political-military plan for complex contingency operations, but so far this process has been fitful.[3] The military is familiar with planning and regards the planning process as indispensable, if only because it produces a framework for later improvisation. Civilian departments have often confused plans with schedules and think plans are not worth the effort. Moreover, some officers in the State Department have an aversion to plans, which they see as impediments to the ambiguity and flexibility required for successful negotiation. For example, at the outset of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, the U.S. military produced a plan to enforce Annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement and was alarmed to discover that no other department had produced a comparable plan.

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[2]For an analysis of the interagency process in complex contingencies, see Pirnie (1998).

[3]Indeed, one report declares that neither the spirit nor intent of PDD-56 is being followed. Operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Serbia, and elsewhere ignored PDD-56 procedures. Scarborough (1999).

Another impediment to coordination is the lack of parallel Department of State and Department of Defense structures on the ground. The Defense Department has regional commands (the unified commands) and regional commanders. The State Department, on the other hand, has ambassadors for each nation but no on-the-ground regional entity whose domain corresponds to that of a CINC. This lack of a State Department regional entity can create confusion by generating multiple reports from the same region and, simultaneously, hinders the development of a coherent presentation of information and responsibilities from the State Department's point of view.

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Fitful as it may be, the U.S. interagency process is a model of efficiency and clarity compared with the international aspects of coordination during complex contingency operations. The arrangements for Bosnia are so complex as to appear unworkable. Indeed, they would be unworkable if the major powers did not share a common understanding of the goals and promote these goals in various venues, including the Security Council, the North Atlantic Council, the Peace Implementation Council, the OSCE, and the Contact Group. The arrangements in Kosovo are similarly complex, although according more formal authority to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General than was accorded initially to the High Representative in Bosnia. In addition, donor countries, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions usually play important roles. Finally, there are a bewildering variety of NGOs, largely funded by the same donor countries but independent of any direct control.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ARRANGEMENTS

The relief community suffers from lack of predictable, dependable arrangements to coordinate the United Nations family of organizations and NGOs at the operational level. The concept of strategic, operational, and tactical levels, familiar to military officers,[4] is shown

[4]Definitions are contained in joint documents, including *Unified Action Armed Forces*, Joint Publication 0-2; *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated*

in Table 8.1 for control arrangements for the U.S. government, the U.S. military, the United Nations family, the International Red Cross and Crescent Movement, and NGOs.[5]

Broadly speaking, the UN family of organizations has a formal arrangement for operational-level coordination but fails to implement it in practice. Alone in the relief community, the ICRC is fully operational and controls operations through Delegates General. NGOs have no formal arrangement to ensure operational-level coordination and must find a venue during actual crises.

Coordination Across the United Nations

On paper, the United Nations appears to have solved the problem of operational-level coordination, but the reality is quite different. In January 1999, the Secretary-General appointed Sergio Vieira de Mello as Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, heading a new Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). De Mello is simultaneously the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) who heads an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), chartered to coordinate efforts of all members of the UN family of organizations. At the operational level, a humanitarian coordinator would ensure coordination among all UN organizations. But some of these organizations resisted efforts by a predecessor, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), to effect coordination. It remains to be seen whether OCHA will have more success than DHA did.

Within the U.S. government, the interagency process can be difficult, even though all agencies are ultimately subordinate to the President. Within the UN family of organizations, the interagency process is

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Terms, Joint Publication 1-02; and service capstone documents, such as *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, Air Force Manual 1-1. At the strategic level, civilian and military leaders define military goals necessary to achieve political purposes. At the operational level, senior military commanders employ military forces throughout a theater or area of operations. At the tactical level, unit commanders fight battles or accomplish those tasks associated with collateral missions such as humanitarian assistance.

[5]Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., Director of the Center of Excellence, sketched a table of this kind to illustrate that civilian agencies, excepting ICRC, lack operational-level control arrangements.

Table 8.1

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Level Structures

Level	United States Government	United States Military	United Nations Family of Organizations	International Committee of the Red Cross	Non-government Organizations
Strategic	President, National Security Council, Principals Committee	National Command Authority; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff	Security Council, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Council of Delegates, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	National and multinational headquarters
Operational	Special envoy; ambassador; commander-in-chief, unified command; commander, joint task force	Commander-in-chief, unified command; commander, joint task force	OCHA (humanitarian coordinator)? Lead agency? Regional Coordinator?	Delegates General	Ad hoc meetings? Civil-military Operations Center (CMOC)?
Tactical	Representatives of U.S. agencies; commanders of military units	Commanders of military units	Efforts of UN programs, funds, and specialized agencies	Efforts of ICRC and national societies	Efforts in the region or country

NOTE: Some titles and organizations are listed under multiple headings (e.g., the unified commands play an operational role in both the U.S. government and as part of the U.S. military) to reflect the multiple arenas in which they operate. A question mark suggests that the body identified makes a questionable contribution at the level indicated.

inherently more difficult because specialized agencies are not subordinate to the Secretary-General and therefore not compelled to coordinate, either at the strategic level through the ERC or at the operational level through a humanitarian coordinator. Moreover, in recent years a rival concept has emerged. During the protracted Bosnia conflict and more recently during the Kosovo crisis, the UNHCR has played the role of lead agency within the UN family. Such a role was natural because massive flows of refugees dominated in both cases and played to the UNHCR's specialty, but this de facto role supplants or disrupts the United Nations' formally declared

arrangements. The danger is that a lead agency will give priority to its own requirements at the expense of an overall effort.

U.S. government officials approve the concept embodied by OCHA and provide funding for the OCHA-administered ReliefWeb. But they take a more reserved attitude toward the Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) located in Geneva. MCDU is intended to ensure the effective use of military and civil defense assets, but it suffers from lack of support among those countries that provide the bulk of such assets during emergencies. Commonly, the United States declines to provide MCDU with data on available assets or to respond directly to requests for assets. MCDU is underfunded and will suffer from the recent ruling that prohibits member states in the United Nations from seconding military officers to the UN without charge.

UN organizations have limitations that can detract from their usefulness. Their coordination with the U.S. government through the U.S. Mission to the United Nations is uneven. They regularly meet with NGOs without inviting U.S. government participants and frequently ignore U.S. government requests for information. UNHCR and WFP are more nimble than other UN organizations, but even they can be slow and bureaucratic, particularly when compared with NGOs. By definition, UN organizations are responsible to member states, even when these states may be aiding combatants or otherwise contributing to a humanitarian crisis. In the interests of transparency, UN organizations may share information with such states, even to the detriment of military operations.

In contrast to NGOs, UN agencies work primarily with host governments, not directly with populations. As a result, they may focus on obtaining government approval rather than on working with local populations. This focus can distort relief efforts when host governments are repressive, corrupt, or incompetent. To maintain a good relationship with the host government, UN organizations may serve particular groups in favor rather than distribute aid according to need. In addition, the host government may misappropriate or profit from relief supplies.

Coordination Within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

In addition to its other responsibilities, the ICRC directs and coordinates the actions of all components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The ICRC does not direct operations from its headquarters in Geneva, relying instead on key individuals in the field, usually designated as Delegates General.

In the course of its duties, the ICRC acquires current information on topics of interest to the military. It will willingly share information concerning human needs, but it will not share information about armed forces. The ICRC learns much about armed forces simply because it is in nearly constant contact with them. Indeed, the ICRC maintains contacts with most of the armed groups in the world, including several that the U.S. government classifies as terrorist. But to preserve its neutrality and impartiality, the ICRC refuses on principle to collect or reveal any information about armed forces that would have intelligence value to an opponent. It will, however, provide information to military authorities and attend military briefings that deal with these aspects of a crisis.

The ICRC is eager to cooperate with the military on common humanitarian goals, but cooperation becomes difficult when the military is pursuing political goals that would compromise the ICRC's neutrality. For example, the ICRC cooperated closely with the U.S. military in Somalia prior to the intervention in December 1992. At the peak, the United States put six C-130 transport aircraft at the disposal of ICRC to conduct humanitarian flights into Somalia. After the United States intervened militarily, cooperation became more difficult and it ceased when the United States abandoned neutrality in its pursuit of the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed.

In recent years, the ICRC has increasingly encountered situations so chaotic that its neutrality and impartiality afford little protection. In Somalia, the ICRC found itself compelled to hire local guards. To maintain impartiality, these guards were drawn from all 31 warring clans and included people who would have looted ICRC supplies had they not been hired to guard them. Broadly speaking, the ICRC welcomes military action that provides general security, but it cannot accept military escort across lines of confrontation because

belligerents would regard such escort as evidence that the ICRC was no longer neutral.

The ICRC's attitude toward the military is still evolving. After recently losing personnel in Chechnya, Sierra Leone, and other war zones, the ICRC has become painfully aware of the need for security. Moreover, it increasingly recognizes that it is no longer impartial when the aid it provides is diverted to combatants and warlords. In the past, ICRC delegates needed a direct order from Geneva to even converse with the military, much less cooperate with them, but today delegates have far more discretionary power.[6] The ICRC now sends its personnel to attend military exercises in an attempt to improve its cooperation with Western military forces.

Although the ICRC's zealous commitment to impartiality is frustrating at times for U.S. officials, respecting this commitment is vital for overall U.S. interests, particularly those of the military. The ICRC's impartiality enables it to visit U.S. prisoners of war. In Iraq and Somalia, the ICRC visited downed U.S. pilots, checking their status and demanding that their treatment comply with international conventions.[7]

Coordination Among NGOs

NGOs have no formal arrangements to promote coordination at the operational level, either within a single NGO or across all NGOs. At the strategic level, they have headquarters that generally advocate humanitarian action, raise funds for the organization, and ensure adherence to standards. At the tactical level, they have field offices that have day-to-day responsibility for programs. There is no intermediate-level arrangement to promote coordination until NGO representatives from different organizations meet to discuss a particular crisis, either in ad hoc meetings or in a setting such as a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Indeed, the CMOC—the operational body that facilitates NGO-military cooperation in the field—was designed to fill the operational void. All interested parties, including agencies of the United Nations, U.S. government agencies,

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[6]Natsios (1995), p. 74.

[7]Bowden (1999), pp. 318–320.

NGOs, and local authorities should meet in the CMOC, which greatly facilitates cooperation.

Although NGOs appear anarchic, they have informal webs that promote coordination, at least among NGOs funded by a strong donor. For example, USAID expects that U.S.-funded NGOs will consult among themselves to develop practical divisions of labor. During crises, certain well-established, U.S.-based NGOs traditionally receive substantial funding from the U.S. government to provide immediate aid. These NGOs cooperate with each other to ensure that at least the overall U.S. effort is somewhat coherent. Among these NGOs are large organizations such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children (U.S. chapter), and World Vision.

Several individual NGOs often try to take the initiative to coordinate their fellow NGOs and plan for future developments. Although this coordination is usually ad hoc, it does allow for an effective response when the crisis in question develops slowly or is of limited scale. NGOs are particularly likely to take such initiative when operating in a highly dangerous area.

Some larger NGOs have central headquarters to promote coordination among their nationally based affiliates. For example, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) has a headquarters in Silver Springs, Maryland, that oversees activities of ADRA worldwide organized under regional offices. CARE, Caritas, Concern, Doctors Without Borders, Mercy Corps International (MCI), Oxfam, Save the Children, and World Vision all have headquarters that coordinate efforts of the nationally based organizations.

In addition, many NGOs are members of professional organizations that promote professional standards. Examples include the U.S.-based InterAction, the European-based Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergency (VOICE), and the International Council of Voluntary Organizations (ICVA). InterAction is a membership organization of approximately 150 U.S.-based NGOs that forms standing committees and task forces to conduct projects on matters of mutual concern to its members. For example, the Sphere Project produced and disseminated a set of minimum standards for disaster response in such areas as water supply, sanitation, nutrition, food

aid, shelter, and health services. InterAction also provides a clearinghouse for the exchange of information and has descriptions of participating NGO activities in various countries.

COORDINATION STRUCTURES

Coordination structures vary from one operation to another, depending upon the situation, the mission, and the policies of host countries and donors. There are four broad possibilities: host country lead, United Nations lead, alliance or coalition lead, and lead country. These are not mutually exclusive alternatives and can be mingled during an operation. The coordination structure shapes the operation, including coordination among actors, tasks to be performed, and rules of engagement. The structures are supported at the local level by the CMOC.

Host Country Lead

When a host country's government is unimpaired, it will usually assert its sovereign right to authorize humanitarian relief as it sees fit. During natural disasters, a host country typically adopts an inclusive policy: It welcomes all the help it can get. But during man-made disasters, a host country may curtail assistance that runs counter to its political goals. For example, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government generally accepted humanitarian assistance during Operation Support Hope in 1994, but expelled 38 NGOs in December 1995 because they refused to accept direction.[8] In some cases, the government may even have collapsed, causing near anarchy. During relief operations in Somalia and Liberia, for example, there was no widely accepted central government that could take the lead.

Figure 8.2 is a simplified depiction of relationships during disaster relief following Hurricane Mitch, which struck the Caribbean and Central America in October 1998. Each affected country had direct working relationships with international organizations, the Pan American Health Organization, the ICRC, and NGOs. In each country, the U.S. ambassador or chargé d'affaires declared a disaster,

[8]Action Against Hunger (1999), p. 28.



NOTE: Direction: management, control *(Webster's Unabridged Dictionary,* 1979); command: the authority a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over a subordinate *(Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* 23 March 1994, amended through 6 April 1999, Joint Pub 1-02); operational control: transferable command authority exercised below the level of combatant command (Joint Pub 1-02); cooperation: working or operating together to one end *(Webster's)*.

Figure 8.2—Host Country Lead

making that country eligible for emergency assistance from the United States. OFDA sent Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to assess the situation and help coordinate the U.S. response. The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) formed task forces that coordinated with the DARTs and were responsive to country teams in the U.S. embassies that were in contact with host country governments. NGOs and the relief community cooperated, but no directed activity occurred even though the U.S. government was leading the relief effort.

United Nations Lead

When a host country's government is impaired, but outside powers do not intervene decisively, agencies of the United Nations may assume coordinating roles. Within the UN family of organizations,

there are two broad possibilities: coordination through the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) or through a lead agency, most likely the UNHCR.

Figure 8.3 offers a simplified view of relationships among agencies supporting the humanitarian effort in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Agreement. During this period, the United States airlifted supplies into Sarajevo and airdropped supplies into Muslim-held enclaves in concert with its NATO allies. According to formal procedures, the ERC, working through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and OCHA, "will mobilize and coordinate collective efforts of the international community, in particular those of the UN system."[9] But the United Nations has continually failed to implement this model. In several recent crises, UNHCR has acted as a lead agency—



Figure 8.3—United Nations Lead

[9]General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which created the predecessor organization Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).

for example in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Agreements and currently in Kosovo.[10]

Alliance or Coalition Lead

During a humanitarian crisis caused by conflict, an alliance or coalition of willing powers, often identical with the major donors, might coordinate assistance. Assistance to Bosnia subsequent to the Dayton Agreement followed this pattern.

Figure 8.4 presents a simplified picture of relationships after Dayton. The highly complex post-Dayton arrangements include roles for the



Figure 8.4—Alliance or Coalition Lead

[10]Although the UNHCR retained formal coordinating responsibility for relief efforts in and around Kosovo [now under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)], the coordinating and relief management functions of UNHCR proved inadequate to the task and "migrated" in practice to NATO. Even in Bosnia, the role of the UNHCR was to some extent overshadowed by NATO and OSCE activities and, at the political level, by the role of the Contact Group.

United Nations and other IOs, a Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), OSCE, and, of course, the former belligerents. Such complex arrangements are workable because the same powers are present in all these organizations and they coordinate among themselves at the policy level through the Contact Group and other means. These same powers (plus Japan) are also the major donors of humanitarian aid. Acting as leader of this alliance, the United States helps to organize donors' conferences under the auspices of the World Bank, which publishes and oversees an overall plan for the reconstruction of Bosnia. NATO forces coordinate with civilian agencies through Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CJCIMIC)—active and reserve civil affairs personnel from around the world who support the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and serve as a link between military and civilian agencies.

Although NATO is the most effective regional alliance, others might also take the lead. In Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took the lead in forming an intervention force. In Africa, the United States may work with non-NATO regional alliances led by important African states, such as Nigeria or South Africa.

Lead Country

One country may take the lead and invite other countries to join it. In this simplest case, the lead country assumes a responsibility for coordination. For example, the United States was lead country during operations Provide Comfort I in Iraq (April–July 1991) and Restore Hope in Somalia (December 1992–May 1993). Other major powers may play this role, as has France in sub-Saharan Africa.

Provide Comfort I was a humanitarian operation to ensure survival of Kurds who had fled from Saddam Hussein's forces in early April 1991 following the Persian Gulf War. Some 750,000 refugees were at risk from exposure, thirst, hunger, and disease, and at peak some 1500 were dying each day. On April 5, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688 authorizing use of force to protect relief operations for these refugees. Under this resolution, the United States organized a joint task force, soon expanded to a combined task force, to secure areas of northern Iraq, deliver

emergency supplies, and assist return of the refugees to their homes. Eleven other nations provided military forces and all (except German forces) were eventually controlled by Combined Task Force Provide Comfort[11] commanded by Lt. Gen. (USA) John M. Shalikashvili. OFDA deployed two DARTs to Turkey to help link civilian and military efforts.

Figure 8.5 shows key relationships during Operation Restore Hope. Restore Hope was intended to ensure survival of Somalis threatened by starvation and disease as a result of interminable violence among rival clans. At peak during 1992, some 1,500,000 Somalis were at risk and some 300,000 are estimated to have died. After a small U.N.-controlled operation proved ineffective, the United States offered to lead a larger military force. On the basis of this offer, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794 authorizing the use of force to establish a secure environment for relief operations. Several other



Figure 8.5—Lead Country

[11]A second task force, designated Task Force Encourage Hope, was formed to construct resettlement camps.

countries also deployed forces to Somalia in anticipation of a larger UN-controlled operation to follow. Most of these forces were temporarily controlled by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by Lt. Gen. (USMC) Robert Johnson, commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force. The United States sent Ambassador Robert B. Oakley as a special envoy to coordinate all U.S. civilian activities in Somalia, provide political advice to Johnson, and work closely with NGOs.[12]

UNITAF coordinated with international and nongovernment organizations through a CMOC. There was a central CMOC in Mogadishu and a satellite center in each of eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (Baidoa, Baledogle, Bardera, Belet, Gianlalassi, Kismayo, Oddur, and Uen). UNITAF took responsibility for airport and seaport operations. It provided security to aid convoys and to air distribution points, and it also dismantled unauthorized checkpoints and enforced an increasingly stringent weapons control policy.

Limits to Coordination Structures

Although the above coordination structures provide some organization to a relief effort, cooperation may still be limited or imperfect. The structures discussed above reflect what has been done on an ad hoc basis. Because the structures often vary considerably from crisis to crisis, establishing relationships and procedures is difficult. Furthermore, the structures rely on NGOs to coordinate their activities but do not direct their effort in any way. Finally, the structures are often highly complex, with many actors and uncertain control and coordination arrangements.

CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

To improve NGO-military familiarity and coordination, the Department of Defense currently sponsors the Center of Excellence (COE) in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, located in Hawaii and affiliated with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).[13]

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[12]Hirsch and Oakley (1995), p.50.

[13]As of this writing, a COE is being established that will be affiliated with U.S. Southern Command.

The COE is a unique organization that focuses on improving coordination at the operational level. The COE builds on the experiences of previous operations to improve civilian and military response.[14]

COE develops training materials and presents courses in humanitarian assistance to both military and humanitarian audiences. Courses include the Combined Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (CHART) and Health Emergencies in Large Populations (HELP). COE developed CHART to introduce civilian and military participants to the fundamentals of relief operations. HELP is a longer, more specialized course originally developed by ICRC. Under current procedures, COE conducts these courses without cost at sites specified by clients.

COE provides support to training, games, and exercises conducted by the military, such as Brave Knight, Prairie Warrior, and Emerald Express. It identifies appropriate subject-matter experts, assists in development of scenarios, plays roles, and assesses relief strategies. COE facilitates flows of information among international organizations, NGOs, government agencies, and the military through its Virtual Information Center and the Pacific Disaster Management Network (PDMIN). COE is currently developing the Combined Event Notification Technology and Unified Reporting (CENTAUR), specialized software originally sponsored by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). COE expected to begin field testing CENTAUR in 1999 and hopes to persuade not only UNICEF but also other UN organizations to adopt the system. The fundamental problem may be

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[14]Congressional mandate established the COE in October 1994. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat from Hawaii, then a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, was the congressional sponsor. Dr. Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., Chairman of the Division of Emergency Medicine, University of Hawaii Schools of Medicine and Public Health, promoted the concept. He envisioned an organization that would help draw together disparate agencies involved in humanitarian assistance. COE currently operates under draft Articles of Association that define an Advisory Committee that includes the sponsoring U.S. Senator; Commander-in-Chief, USPACOM (USCINCPAC); Commanding General, Tripler Army Medical Center (Tripler AMC); President, University of Hawaii; and the Director, COE. Reflecting its origins, COE initially tended to have its closest relationship with Tripler AMC, but in recent years it has begun to develop closer relations with USPACOM. COE currently has 26 personnel, many seconded from other organizations including the Center for Disease Control (CDC), and an annual budget of $5 million. Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (1998), p. 7.

to persuade these organizations to share information fully. COE also sponsors research projects on topics that cut across organizational lines, such as development of measures of effectiveness for health in refugee camps.

Beyond these activities, COE provides a source of expertise in humanitarian assistance that is constantly available to USPACOM. COE personnel are broadly familiar with every aspect of humanitarian assistance and are personally acquainted with patterns of need and the assets available to address these needs through the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR). Therefore, personnel drawn from COE would be well qualified to fulfill the role of humanitarian advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC).

Despite its many advantages, military coordination with potential partners in a humanitarian crisis is often difficult because there is no official structure to coordinate activities. Particularly at the operational level, coordination among NGOs, IOs, donor governments, and military forces lacks structure. The structures described above, including the COE, offer only a limited means of coordinating a relief effort. In addition, as discussed further in the following chapter, many relief agencies have characteristics that hinder coordination and may make them difficult partners.

Chapter Nine

BARRIERS TO IMPROVED COORDINATION WITH RELIEF AGENCIES

Coordination between the military and relief partners, particularly NGOs, is often uneven and uncertain. NGOs can be difficult partners, especially for the military. There is a wide gap in organizational culture, and NGOs are inhibited by their concern for neutrality and impartiality. NGOs also do not plan well, making cooperation before a crisis difficult. There is an evident lack of mutual familiarity, and NGOs are often reluctant to share information with the military. NGOs and the military may compete for publicity and they have different time horizons. Finally, NGOs are not certain of the military's true commitment to humanitarian missions.

The barriers to better military-NGO coordination are numerous but not insurmountable. Indeed, during major operations, strongly motivated people in both camps usually find ways to surmount these barriers, but valuable time is lost inventing and reinventing these solutions. Relationships have improved in recent years, but considerable progress is necessary before both sides can realize the advantages of improved cooperation. This chapter describes common barriers and notes progress in reducing them.

DISPARATE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES

Differences among organizational cultures are a formidable barrier to NGO-military coordination. Differences include:

- *Hierarchies versus decentralization*. NGO organizational structure is very different from that of the military. Most NGOs are managed in a highly decentralized manner, with scope for initiative in the field. Typically, they prefer to work by consensus rather than responding to direction. Rather than being hierarchical, with a clear and orderly assignment of responsibility and authority, NGO structure is usually egalitarian, with much debate required before a consensus-based decision is reached. Accustomed to this autonomy, many NGO personnel have little patience with military hierarchies. They tend to resent military officers' typical question: "who's in charge?"
- *Discomfort with the use of force.* Some NGO personnel are skeptical of the morality and efficacy of military force. They are accustomed to regarding the military as part of the problem and remain critical of the military even while it provides essential support.[1] At times this discomfort reflects an overall unease about military operations, which can interfere with information sharing. This can be accentuated when the meetings are held on a military facility and NGOs are required to submit to elaborate checkpoint procedures before entering.[2]
- *Different ways of life.* The values and lifestyles of many NGO employees are not always compatible with values prevalent in the military. The NGO community features respectable church-based aid multinationals represented by nuns and sophisticated groups of highly qualified scientific, technical, and medical professionals, but it also includes "a colorful collection of Woodstock grads, former Merry Pranksters and other assorted acid-heads, eco-freaks, save-the-whalers, doomsday mystics,

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[1]Some NGO personnel can be abusive to the military even as they seek military assistance. In Somalia, for example, NGOs demanded transportation, security, and communications assistance yet wanted the military to minimize its presence. Their attitude was described by one NGO observer as: "Give us a ride. Save our lives. But don't come near us."

[2]For example, when NGO representatives met with U.S. military staff in Tuzla, they were intimidated by the security precautions, even though the military treated them with deference. The CMOC was located inside Task Force Eagle's headquarters facilities, forcing the relief agencies to go through security at the base perimeter (as well as to travel several miles to attend the meetings). Subsequently, many of these NGO representatives avoided interaction with the military.

poets and hangers-on."[3] Some NGO personnel are amateurish, have strange personal biographies, or come from countries hostile to the United States.

- *Skepticism about force protection.* NGOs often wonder why well-armed military units emphasize force protection while working in areas where NGOs have long operated without protection. In addition, NGO personnel can be intimidated by displays of military force.
- *Secrecy.* NGOs are highly transparent organizations. They usually publicize their operations to attract funding from international, governmental, and private donors. As a result, they have little understanding for military secrecy and tend to resent the classification system.

Because of these cultural differences, NGO and military officials may not understand each other's priorities or procedures and resent what they see as indifference on the other side.

These differences, however, may be overstated and mask similarities that make coordination easier. Like the military, NGO personnel are often highly idealistic and willing to dedicate their lives to helping others. Many NGO personnel are exceptionally brave, living and working in war zones where banditry and disease are common. NGO personnel, especially those in the field, are focused on the mission and willing to use work-arounds or otherwise deviate from accepted procedures to finish the job. Finally, like the military, NGO personnel are comfortable with foreign cultures and ideas and have an international perspective.

CONCERNS ABOUT NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY

NGOs rely heavily on their neutrality to protect themselves.[4] They seek to project a certain image: They want local authorities and

[3]Rowland (1973), p. 1.

[4]The "Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief" spearheaded by the ICRC, the Red Crescent, Save the Children, Oxfam, the Lutheran World Federation, and the World Council of Churches lists the most important principles that should guide disaster response NGOs. To the point of redundancy, fully the first four of these principles reit-

warring parties to feel that NGO personnel are basically harmless, possibly even useful, while attacking them would needlessly bring bad press, anger in the countries they are nationals of, future boycotts by their organization when their side is the one that needs help, and so on. This explains the NGOs' sometimes baffling attitude toward military protection. Even though they may need an armed guard or a military escort in a particular situation, they may fear that, in the long run, association with the military threatens their image and endangers them. As Jean-François Vidal of Action Against Hunger noted:

> Our protection is usually the perception people have of us. We are endangered when we appear close to the military. We have no limits on sharing humanitarian information with the military. Reporting incidents is not a problem. But sharing military intelligence, such as strength and weaponry of belligerents, is dangerous for us. The farther we are from the guns, the better we feel.[5]

In the field, NGO operatives often walk a fine line. By barter, by compromise, by charm, or by mobilizing public opinion, they try to overcome obstacles as they arise. This can mean disregarding or deliberately flouting the distinction between friend and foe. As John Ashton of Response International noted in an interview:

> When the UN closes the line, that doesn't mean we stop. And people respect that. You have to establish relationships, find out what people want. We would talk to the Serb soldiers and they would say, my uncle needs this kind of medication, my niece needs that, my brother needs this, etc. We would get them the stuff, and in exchange they allowed things to go into Sarajevo. Everybody has needs, even the aggressor. Of course they use aid as a leverage point but they can be flexible once they trust you.

In essence, these organizations stay safe by making themselves nonthreatening: Their weakness protects them. The ICRC and many NGOs as well also embrace neutrality in their mission. They seek to

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erate the goals of independence and autonomy, emphasizing how fundamental these values are to NGOs.

[5]Authors' interview.

provide aid to all individuals, regardless of their political position or past activities.

Preserving neutrality and impartiality, however, becomes difficult—and often impossible—when the United Nations or a member state such as the United States undertakes enforcement. As Joelle Tanguy, the Executive Director of MSF, noted:

> I'm afraid that in the minds of Americans and Europeans, the military and the relief organizations are working on one side of the war together. . . . We're all part of the same operation, but we can't be. Independence is our main asset—to be able to walk into a war zone and act as independent relief workers.[6]

In Somalia, for example, the United States and UNOSOM II (the second UN Operation in Somalia) attempted to apprehend the Somali warlord Aideed, thereby forfeiting impartiality, at least in the eyes of his supporters.[7] NGOs feared that this loss of neutrality would impede their operations and lead belligerents to see them as allied with combatants, and they worried that a military conflict could lead to their personnel being targeted. World Vision personnel were, in fact, attacked by militia forces expressing their displeasure with the United States-led enforcement. Similarly, even before the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, some NGOs avoided ties to the military, in part because many of their third-country national employees were hostile to NATO. Once the bombing began, impartiality became far harder.

Because the United States is viewed as having a global agenda, NGOs may fear being seen as a pawn in U.S. policy even in cases like

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[6]Becker (1999).

[7]The concepts of neutrality and impartiality are not always well understood or correctly applied. Neutrality implies that all parties will be equally affected by an action. But no peace operation, not even unarmed monitoring, will be likely to affect all parties equally and therefore none is neutral. Impartiality implies that the United Nations, normally the Security Council, believes all parties share responsibility and therefore refuses to identify aggressor or victim. Peace operations are or should be impartial. In Somalia, the Security Council was impartial in the sense that it would presumably have attempted to enforce the peace agreements on any party found in violation of them—particularly if, as Aideed did, they ambushed UN peacekeepers. But even Western commentators failed to understand this distinction, and Aideed and his supporters believed anyway that they were being unfairly singled out.

Rwanda, where the United States concern was almost entirely humanitarian. ICRC officials have more difficulty working with the U.S. military than with those of smaller powers, such as Canada or Sweden, because the United States usually has a political agenda—or is seen as having one.[8] NGOs thus often guard against even the appearance of partiality by avoiding unnecessary contact with military staff. As one NGO official noted, "walking into a bar with an officer can hurt our impartiality." Antoine Gerard of MSF noted in an interview:

> We try as much as we can to differentiate from any military that is present. The image of cooperating with the air force is scary for us. This would mean recognizing that we are part of the conflict, and it would send a confusing message to the populations we are trying to help.

This concern hinders closer personal relations and the communication that can ensure smooth operations.

NGOs themselves, however, often have trouble living up to their ideals of neutrality. Neutrality and the aim of remaining extraneous to a conflict are often unrealistic goals, perhaps particularly in contemporary conflicts. NGOs are aware of this and engage in considerable soul-searching. In a typical position paper on this issue, prepared by and for NGOs, Hugo Slim notes that:

> in any analysis of the causes of violent conflict, it is very important to recognize the part NGOs and aid can play in escalating conflict. Any analysis of violence should recognize how complicated responsible emergency work is during conflict and how NGO programs can so easily become part of the cycle of violence.[9]

Similarly, an analysis of NGO work in Mozambique and Sudan notes that NGOs may contribute to the fighting inadvertently, because their relief is a valued commodity by locals, which makes them a target for rival militias. Indeed, the presence of NGOs can even contribute to the suffering of innocents: Unscrupulous warlords may

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[8]Seiple (1996), p. 45; interviews with relief officials corroborate this point.

[9]Slim (1996).

increase overall suffering and destitution to attract relief they can control and parcel out for their own supporters.[10] NGOs also at times ignore the human rights problems their aid inadvertently abets. NGOs remained in Zaire and treated Hutu refugees from Rwanda, even though their assistance directly aided Hutu warlords who had committed a genocide in Rwanda and were continuing cross-border raids.

The situation becomes stickier still in active-combat situations. NGOs are not above purchasing access, safe passage, or permits with bribes. They thus strengthen the warlords who cause much of the suffering.[11] Currently, in Afghanistan, the usually fastidious MSF has broken ranks with other NGOs by providing money and support for the Taliban and letting them dictate the terms of medical treatment, in order to be allowed to remain.[12]

LIMITED NGO ABILITY TO PLAN

NGOs are often accused of being chaotic and uncoordinated in their activities. Although NGOs want to improve planning—and at times they have coordinated their actions impressively—they face objective limits to how well they *can* plan.

The NGO emphasis on impartiality and independence hinders long-term planning with the military. Cooperation that requires a formal, public relationship, or seems to limit the autonomy of NGOs, will probably be resisted by NGO leaders. This independence is an asset that allows NGOs to operate where organizations tied to the U.S.

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[10] Keen and Wilson (1994).

[11] Whether the chance to help the victims justifies the compromised principles can be a difficult call. German Greens were ridiculed when, following their visit to the Bosnian war zone, they refused to give their bulletproof vests to Bosnian civilians who requested them, on the grounds that this would amount to supplying one side over another with war-related items.

[12] The arrest, in April 1999, of two Australian CARE humanitarian aid workers, and the announced intent of the Milosevic government to put them on trial as NATO spies, represents a new and alarming watershed. In their information exchanges with the military, and precisely to avoid charges such as these, NGOs officially aim to impart only facts relevant to the humanitarian crisis and nothing of military use. Incidents such as this may inspire the NGOs to seek greater distance from the military or it may drive them closer to whatever protection the military can provide.

government are not welcome, but it hinders coordination beyond ad hoc measures.

In addition to concerns about autonomy, many analysts suggest that poor NGO planning arises from the nature of the problems being addressed: Emergencies, they point out, are by definition unexpected, abrupt, and unpredictable events and are thus resistant to structure and preplanning. Essential goods are often missing, unavailable, or delayed. A generator may be en route, but the airport is not functioning; it may have arrived but cannot be unloaded because the workers are not there; or it may have been unloaded but there is no secure storage or forward transportation; and so on. Information may be sketchy and not always reliable. An NGO may have to deal with the national police force and the official military, one or more rival militias, peacekeeping troops, international agencies, representatives of various governments and of different militaries, the media, and other NGOs, all of which have different agendas, infrastructures, and rules.

The nature of relief work produces a frustrating and at times fatal combination of redundancy and gaps. Information flows may be poor, particularly early in a crisis. There have literally been cases, in African famines, where camps received boxes of eating utensils but not any food. One location may receive the vaccines and another, hundreds of miles away, the syringes for dispensing them. Lack of information exacerbates the problems, since workers on the ground cannot be sure if or when urgently needed supplies will arrive.[13]

The "chaos argument," while having some validity, should not be overstated. The argument that the NGOs' chaotic operating environment produces poor planning is shaky; the same is true of wars, which have produced institutions, such as the military staff,

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[13]Balancing the massive emergency-care needs against the danger of an epidemic, medical workers in Sudan reluctantly decided they could no longer wait for the vaccination guns that would have allowed a rapid and efficient inoculation, and instead they began vaccinating by syringe. Given the small number of aid workers in this medical project and the large number of refugees, this meant neglecting other essential operations, such as the infant oral rehydration program and critical care. Neglecting these meant that people would die, but, given the poor hygiene conditions and unsafe water supply, the danger of an epidemic seemed more grave. Two days later the guns arrived.

that are the very epitome of structure and preplanning. Many of the worst NGO problems result from inadequate coordination and a cumbersome start-up process. In contrast to the military, no NGO institution has responsibility for the entire effort. There is redundancy in some areas and complete failure in others. Too many people are on location without clear division of labor; the processing of each task consists of long sequences with many opportunities for things to go wrong or be delayed; and there is often no command structure or even anyone reliably in charge. Even if everyone involved has the same goal in mind and is of good will—a precondition that definitely does not hold true in most international emergencies—the involvement of so many people and agencies creates clumsiness and inefficiency. The NGOs' distrust of hierarchy hinders attempts to bring order to this chaos.

The sheer number of institutions, and the small size of many of them, can hinder coordination. Relief work requires the interplay of multiple actors and sovereignties, all of whom have different agendas, structures, and chains of command, and many of whom are in a state of rivalry or hostility with each other. In any given crisis, multiple levels of coordination are necessary with and between national governments, international organizations, national aid organizations, and NGOs. NGOs operate in an environment that is characterized by the absence of authority or, more often, the presence of several competing, sometimes even warring authorities.

NGO problems with planning can begin with the donors, who range from individuals filling up cardboard boxes with their family's outgrown winter clothes to church groups running collection drives to businesses and corporations of all sizes and compositions. These sponsors do not necessarily give what is needed; they give what they can spare and think appropriate, which can include medication well past its expiration date, clothing unsuitable to the climate, and funding tied to conditions that hamper the recipients. Clearly, it would be sensible to stockpile donations independently of a crisis, when one has the leisure to sort and review and catalogue, and certainly this happens too, but human psychology is such that the bulk of donations pour in when a crisis occurs and segments of the world public, for reasons of proximity, dramatic camera footage, or some other emotional affinity, urgently feel moved to help and give.

NGOs are also affected by constraints and traditions within their own community. For instance, many NGOs are accustomed to subsector coordination on the basis of some kind of affinity. Church organizations tend to coordinate with other church organizations, medical groups with other medical groups, and so on. These organizations may not talk to others outside their community.

Over time, many of these problems are sorted out. NGOs in the field establish structures for communicating and arranging a division of labor. Personal ties in the relief community are often strong, creating impressive networks that enable experienced individuals to informally coordinate their activities with others. In the early days of a crisis, however, the lack of advanced planning is particularly troublesome.

AMBIVALENCE ABOUT SHARING INFORMATION

Although NGOs are often open with information concerning the needs of suffering people, they may be reluctant to share other information with the U.S. military. NGOs are hesitant to provide information on personnel and staff, including third-country nationals. They are often particularly reluctant to share information on the host government, fearing that it will compromise their access to crisis zones.

Some NGO officials worry that the military seeks to collect information that goes well beyond the immediate crisis. Similarly, the ICRC fears being seen as spies—by both local parties and U.S. officials—because they regularly meet with people on all sides of a conflict.

NGOs do not want information-sharing to be a one-way street and resent what they deem as one-sided information exchanges. Military concerns about classification further hinder information-sharing. In Somalia, for example, many NGO members became frustrated by the military's refusal to discuss fighting that occurred in NGO areas of operation. For example, in the Civil-Military Operations Center NGO participants wondered, "What isn't the military telling us?" If the military is not up-front about what it is not sharing, such as information on the movement of forces, NGOs may believe they are hiding information as a matter of policy. As one relief official noted:

> In Somalia, the military would open meetings with weather reports, but we all knew what the weather was and it seldom varied. Then an NGO would mention that fighting had occurred in its area during the night but the military would refuse to discuss the topic because it was classified. Thus the military communicated useless information but declined to share information that could have been helpful. We wanted to know whether the military was informed about the security situation and whether it intended to react to outbreaks of fighting. The military cannot expect NGOs to provide information unless it is also willing to talk.

NGOs regularly trade information among themselves and expect the military to trade as well.

The information NGOs provide is at times skewed. Relief personnel new to the crisis area may know little about local conditions or actors beyond their immediate area of operation. Relief agencies also have a financial interest in dramatizing a crisis: They know that day-to-day misery receives far less support than do sudden, heart-wrenching crises that grab media attention. Thus, they may play up suffering to gain funding for their less-glamorous activities.

As with other generalizations about NGOs, this problem varies from organization to organization. The larger, more-established NGOs are less likely to manipulate information or resist cooperation with the military, largely because they expect to work with the military again in the future. Smaller NGOs, and many non-U.S. NGOs, are often far more reluctant to share information with the military.

In general, NGOs are more willing to share information with elements of the U.S. government who are not in uniform. USAID personnel or civil affairs officers, for example, are considered more suitable for information exchanges, even though these officials then relay the information to the military. As with other NGO concerns, much of this distinction boils down to perception: A uniformed military officer is often more suspect than other individuals regardless of the nature of the mission or that individual's activities.

COMPETITION FOR PUBLICITY

Relief agencies compete against one another to gain scarce funds, a competition that hinders cooperation among them and with the U.S.

military. The more dramatic and heart-wrenching the story NGOs can tell to potential donors, the more money they are able to raise.[14] In practice, this may lead NGOs to devote considerable attention to public relations and the media, to prove to donors and the public at large that they are active.[15] Even UN agencies share this concern. As one WFP official noted, "It isn't just doing the good deed. We have to be seen doing it."[16]

In their drive for publicity, NGOs may seek a visible role in the relief effort even when their participation contributes relatively little. In the early days of a crisis, some NGOs show up to demonstrate to their donors that they are present and contributing—an image that makes it easier for them to secure funding. This visible presence, however, can interfere with the smooth flow of aid and personnel to a distressed region. Moreover, it may lead to the neglect of less-glamorous elements of an aid operation, such as sanitation. NGO competition with one another and the military often increases as a crisis matures. Early on, there are simply too few people and too many problems. Over time, however, NGOs begin to compete for missions, both among themselves and with the military.

Publicity concerns also contribute to inefficient resource allocation. During the April 1999 refugee crisis in Kosovo, experts explained on television why only cash donations made sense, while at the same time the Kosovar Relief Fund in New York and Washington was busily calling for donations of cases of bottled water, canned goods, and blankets. Fund officials were thrilled to have persuaded Mayor Guiliani to open New York fire stations to receive these goods, oblivious to the fact that everything would then have to be flown a significant distance at great expense. Such donation drives have the advantage of being tangible and visible, and thus perhaps carry a public relations benefit, but the opportunity cost is high. People who went to the trouble of dropping off bags of canned soup would almost certainly have been willing to donate cash instead but will now consider that they have done their bit.

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[14] Natsios (1995), p. 71.

[15] Seiple (1996), p. 86.

[16] Pope (1999).

Fund-raising sensitivity also may cause inadvertent resentment of the military. Military forces quickly attract the camera. Thus, when the military is in the field, it often becomes harder for an NGO to claim credit for relief activities or otherwise raise money.

NGOs' desires to gain recognition for their efforts can contribute to political pressure on the military operation. NGOs—both local and national—will try to work through Congress to ensure that their contribution receives the priority they believe it deserves. If they deem it necessary, NGOs can generate a storm of controversy. This can lead to political decisions taking precedence over those of relief professionals.

VARYING TIME HORIZONS

Because they will be on the scene after the military departs, NGOs have a different perspective on relief operations. NGOs cannot afford poor relations with locals, no matter how thuggish. As one NGO official noted about Haiti, "NGOs were there before the military arrived and remained there afterwards." Thus, they must weigh the benefits of short-term cooperation with the military against the possible negative consequences of long-term alienation.

The different time horizon gives NGOs a different perspective on U.S. offers of security assistance. Although in the short term an NGO may be safer because of U.S. protection, the protection may fatally compromise the NGO in the eyes of the locals after the United States departs. Thus NGOs may be reluctant to accept U.S. offers of security if they plan to continue operations in the country over the long term. Moreover, NGO officials have learned from past experience that the U.S. military can depart quickly with little warning.

NGOs, particularly those involved in long-term development work, and the military often measure success differently.[17] Military officials may arrive on the scene of an intervention with quantitative

[17]NGOs, however, may ignore long-term needs. Donor countries often care little about long-term relief, focusing their attention on highly visible crises. As a result, there is less incentive for NGOs to emphasize long-term development. Similarly, the presence of the military often concentrates political attention on immediate gains. Forman and Parhad (1997).

measures of success, such as reducing mortality rates or restoring an infrastructure. For NGOs, success may be measured by using resources efficiently, not by solving the problem.[18]

NGOs are particularly skeptical of the military's focus on the "exit strategy"—a complaint almost universally shared by NGO interlocutors. Because NGOs will remain in the country after the military has departed, they do not share the military's focus on accomplishing the tasks at hand to facilitate an on-time departure. They may see this talk as proof that the military is not committed to solving the problem in a thorough way.

MUTUAL LACK OF FAMILIARITY

Although knowledge has grown in the last decade, military officers and NGO officials often have little understanding of each other's institutions and operating procedures. Many military officials lack an understanding of the distinct charters and doctrines of NGOs, failing to recognize that what works with the IRC will not work with the ICRC.[19] In turn, aid organizations criticize the military for not understanding their hierarchies. As one aid official noted in an interview, "The military should accord the heads of major NGOs the respect normally granted to a general officer."

The military may not be familiar with important NGOs in the AOR. Before IFOR (Implementation Force, Operation Joint Endeavor), the United States European Command (USEUCOM) was not aware of how to contact NGOs in the area. Similar problems occurred in operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, where the NGOs were treated as an afterthought despite their important role in an operation.

The reason for this lack of knowledge is institutional. Although many officers have worked with relief agencies over the past decade, little effort has been made to retain this knowledge. In the military, only civil affairs officials routinely work with NGOs, and almost all these

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[18]UNHCR (1995), p. 15.

[19]Dworken (1996), pp. 19–20.

capabilities are in the reserve forces.[20] Obtaining knowledge before a crisis, when reserve forces are less likely to be deployed, is therefore difficult. Although local country teams bear some responsibility for tracking NGO activities, in practice local embassies are often overextended and have little knowledge of aid agency activities. In the Air Force in particular, there is no institutional responsibility for tracking NGO activities and ensuring liaison with important NGOs.

Many NGO officials see little need to volunteer information on their activities.[21] In Rwanda, NGOs, the United Nations, and the U.S. military were all unaware of which NGOs were operating in the region.[22] Many NGOs do not register with the U.S. embassy or otherwise make their presence known. In Rwanda, Somalia, and other crises, NGOs often simply appeared without prior arrangements to be received.[23]

Ignorance of the military on the NGO side compounds the problem. NGO officials often are completely ignorant of the military. Military organization, hierarchies, and capabilities may be understood through movies rather than through experience. Even ICRC officials have little knowledge of the military or how it operates despite their regular presence in war zones. Discovering existing, well-established military programs for providing lift—such as Denton Program flights—often occurs by chance.

As a result of this ignorance, aid organizations may have unrealistic demands of what the military can provide. In Somalia, for example, aid organization personnel expected an almost instant deployment of U.S. personnel throughout Somalia after the decision to intervene

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[20]Barnes (1989).

[21]Seiple (1996), p. 39.

[22]Seiple (1996), p. 150.

[23]In recent years, NGOs and the U.S. government have taken steps to improve coordination. InterAction—the American Council for Voluntary International Aid—was founded to improve coordination and professionalism among its members. With assistance from OFDA, InterAction is composed of over 150 U.S.-funded NGOs. It holds regular meetings and provides a place for the military and other government organizations to communicate with NGOs. Similar umbrella organizations exist for European NGOs, and several UN agencies also work with umbrella groups of NGOs that are common partners for them.

was announced.[24] Similarly, some NGOs assumed that the United States has superb intelligence on any crisis. U.S. officials' claims that they did not know where IDPs were or understand the local political situation were met with skepticism.

As a result of this limited familiarity, the military may not know who key relief partners and other important actors are in the early days of a crisis. As the USAFE after-action review of Support Hope noted, military personnel and the relief community "met on the dance floor."[25] Possible information sources are not sufficiently exploited both before and during a crisis. Before the intervention in Somalia, in-country NGOs were not asked to provide information. Similarly, U.S. personnel did not interview UN and NGO personnel before intervening in Rwanda. This failure to exploit available resources in Rwanda persisted during the intervention: The one intelligence representative in Kigali was also tasked with a host of other duties, including chaperoning visiting officials.[26]

LIMITED COORDINATION WITHIN NGOs

NGOs often do not coordinate well within their own organizations, leading to disjunctures during relief operations. The concerns of NGO field officers may differ considerably from those of their home agencies. Not surprisingly, field officers focus on day-to-day operations. At the national level, however, NGOs are concerned with pleasing their donors and maintaining a positive image for the overall organization.[27] Moreover, as noted above, the lack of an operational-level office for NGOs hinders coordination.

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[24]Kennedy (1997), p. 105.

[25]United States European Command, *Operation Support Hope,* p. 3.

[26]Seiple (1996), p. 111.

[27]Dworken (1996), p. 16. The NGO operating environment also helps explain common differences between NGO headquarters staff and the field staff. Members of the field staff, prepared to face prolonged discomfort and personal risk, may be a different personality type than the home office staff, and they are likely to develop a different level of material and emotional involvement with the population they are helping. As with other undertakings and organizations, the view from headquarters is not necessarily the same as the view in the field.

Differences between NGO headquarters and field workers can decrease the benefits of previous NGO-military familiarization. Because of regular rotations and the large number of poorly trained, uninitiated personnel who travel to the field, agreements worked out with the main organization may not be carried out in the field. Aid organization officials who participate in exercises tend to be headquarters officials who seek to build long-term relationships rather than field workers.[28] Of all the NGO and UN staff, roughly 60 percent go into the field without any briefing. Often, this staff is recruited hastily, with little training or understanding of the NGOs' overall mission, let alone procedures worked out in advance to improve military cooperation.[29] Individual personnel come to rely heavily on their own instincts, and their own prejudices, in making decisions. For similar reasons, NGO officials in the field often lack the familiarity with the military that may have been painstakingly developed by NGO headquarters officials during exercises and by liaison staff in advance of a crisis.

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE MILITARY'S COMMITMENT

NGOs may be reluctant to invest in better coordination with the military unless they can foresee benefit. Most NGOs are small organizations with limited resources. Several interlocutors said that in the early 1990s they believed the U.S. military would often participate in relief operations during crises. They felt disillusioned when the United States decided not to participate or participated sparingly as during the Rwanda crisis. They hesitate to invest in exercises and planning, knowing that the U.S. government may not send its military to help after all.

Uncertainty leads NGOs to believe that any identity of interest between themselves and the U.S. military is likely to be situational and transitory.[30] In the next big crisis, whatever it may be, the United

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[28]Dworken (1996), p. 31.

[29]Forman and Parhad (1997).

[30]Many NGOs also practice situational ethics, accepting military contributions while remaining hesitant to associate more closely with the military on general principles. There are situations—and they are becoming the rule rather than the exception—where the benefits of ties to the military are so essential that they will overcome any

States may not become involved. The NGOs, however, will most probably be there. As they see it, compromising their ability to function as neutral actors in a subsequent crisis is too high a price for better operations under a U.S. umbrella in a crisis.

IMPROVING PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

Several of the above problems have declined in severity in the last decade. Hostile stereotypes are falling, although they still interfere with cooperation. In the past, many military officers viewed NGO employees as young, antimilitary, self-righteous, incompetent, and unappreciative of security needs.[31] Their good intentions could produce disastrous results. As Jonathan Dworken notes, "Officers simply did not see women in their late-twenties with Birkenstock sandals and 'Save the Whales' T-shirts as experts worthy of consultation."[32] Our interviews suggest, however, a sea change in attitudes on both sides. Almost all NGOs and military officials noted their respect for the other and the need for consultation and cooperation. Almost all military officers who had worked with NGOs in crises noted their bravery and dedication.

Repeated interaction during crises and a decline in ideological tension after the end of the Cold War have helped reduce NGO suspicion of the military. NGO officials recognize that the military can respond to a crisis quickly and that, when U.S. forces arrive, they are ready to help the immediate relief effort. In addition, NGO members recognize that the military has made, and is making, a good-faith effort to improve its knowledge of NGOs and humanitarian relief problems in general. Several interlocutors noted that NGO officials

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ideological qualms on the part of any NGO. The NGOs see no inherent contradiction in their position; other institutions often do. MSF refused the DoD offer to participate in the airlift for Hurricane Mitch relief but wanted the United States to provide aerial reconnaissance. To the military, this can look hypocritical: If you do not want to "corrupt yourself" through proximity to the military, you at least should be consistent. To MSF, their position is that they will accept help from the military only in an exceptional circumstance, an emergency. They had alternatives to the airlift, so they did not accept it. But when their helicopter went missing in Honduras, with medical personnel and a patient on board, the chance to save them overrode their scruples about requesting help from the military.

[31]Kennedy (1997), p. 109.

[32]Dworken (1995), pp. 19–20.

have far more respect for the military than they did just ten years ago—a sentiment corroborated by other interviews we conducted.

Growing concerns about security also are leading NGOs to shed some of their concerns about closer ties to the military. Almost all interlocutors noted that their organizations were far more focused on security than in the past and that they saw the military as a potential ally. Many NGOs report a lessening of respect for neutral parties present in a conflict, a breakdown of spoken and unspoken rules safeguarding helpers. MSF has had a number of doctors assassinated and seen its personnel and property targeted in Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. It cites Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Chechnya, Rwanda, and Congo as areas where volunteers work under serious threat. Its activity report notes: "worldwide conflicts in which the impartial provision of humanitarian aid is less and less respected are becoming more common."[33] Concerns about evacuation in a crisis also are prompting many to seek better relations with the military.

These improving prospects for cooperation augur well for future NGO-military relations. If the military and NGOs are willing to implement procedural changes and devote resources to enhanced cooperation, overall performance in relief operations will improve. Several changes that would improve cooperation are presented in the final part of this report.

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[33]Brauman (1993).

Chapter Eleven

A STRATEGY TO IMPROVE COORDINATION

This chapter outlines a strategy to improve coordination with relief agencies during humanitarian crises, including suggestions for dividing up responsibility for implementing the strategy. It identifies the advantages of such a strategy as well as potential difficulties. By implementing this strategy, the military will be better able to take advantage of relief agency capabilities and minimize problems.

More effective provision of relief requires overcoming or minimizing many of the problems that currently affect cooperation between the military and relief agencies and capitalizing on U.S.-allied synergies. A strategy to improve coordination would have the following objectives:

- Ensuring familiarity with relevant relief organizations.
- Improving information sharing both before and during crises.
- Fostering better long-term planning and coordination by closely engaging select relief organizations.
- Improving coordination of the relief flow during humanitarian crises.
- Encouraging developments among U.S. European allies to improve their humanitarian relief capabilities.[1]

[1]These objectives overlap and reinforce one another. Increasing familiarity and engaging key NGOs will ease the coordination of the airflow during a crisis. Similarly, better information sharing will strengthen the overall engagement effort.

Meeting these objectives requires both institutional changes in the U.S. military at multiple levels and a change in procedures for carrying out relief operations.

At a minimum, the military should ensure that its key personnel are familiar with organizations relevant to relief operations. At the same time, it should help these same organizations become more familiar with the military's organization and capabilities. Relevant organizations would include several agencies in the UN family, the ICRC, and a broad spectrum of NGOs. Familiarization should promote mutual understanding and better cooperation across the military, UN agencies, and NGOs.

In addition, the military should closely engage select organizations that play key roles during humanitarian crises in order to improve long-term planning. Key organizations would include agencies in the UN family (e.g., OCHA, WFP, UNHCR), the ICRC, and selected NGOs, particularly the core-team NGOs identified earlier. Engagement would speed response and increase efficiency during all phases of a humanitarian crisis, especially during the initial phase when delay might cost lives.

Building on both these efforts, the military should initiate actions to improve coordination of the relief flow during humanitarian crises. The services should offer their impressive logistics capabilities to help manage the airlift and sealift of supplies, particularly in the early days of a crisis. To be fully effective, these actions should address both the narrower problem of managing the aid flow and the broader, more fundamental problem of establishing priorities.

The military should also recognize the important role that European allies can play in responding to complex emergencies. The United States should encourage European militaries to further develop their capabilities in this regard. Equally important, the U.S. military should improve its ability to leverage these capabilities and augment them with its own.

The particular requirement will determine which military element should act to achieve the objectives. The unified command is the most appropriate entity to carry out many of the most important actions recommended below. Almost all of the recommendations apply to the regional commands (i.e., USEUCOM, USCENTCOM,

USPACOM, and the USSOUTHCOM, but several key recommendations apply to functional commands, particularly the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Several vital steps, however, require the armed services, the Joint Staff, or DoD to play a leading role. When appropriate, the remainder of this chapter links specific recommendations to appropriate elements within the military.[2]

The military cannot promote coordination alone. An effort to engage NGOs and improve the flow of aid requires not only cooperation among the organizations identified in this report but also among donor and host countries at high political levels. This is particularly true regarding steps to improve the capabilities of European allies. But the military can improve performance by identifying the problems, advocating workable solutions, and promoting solutions before crisis occurs.

ENSURE FAMILIARITY: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Greater familiarity would promote mutual understanding between the military and relief organizations and reduce lingering suspicions of the military within some NGOs. It also would help the military take advantage of expertise resident in the NGOs and smooth coordination during a crisis. The military should become familiar with all NGOs operating during a crisis, particularly those belonging to the "core" category. Although minor and advocacy NGOs may contribute relatively little to the overall operation, their personnel nevertheless could be taken hostage, threatened, need transport, or otherwise require military assistance. Moreover, an otherwise minor NGO may play a major role in a particular contingency.

The following initiatives, if taken by the unified commands (and, to a lesser degree, the armed services, and other actors in the defense community) would help ensure greater familiarity:

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[2]Because of the role of USEUCOM in initiating this research, many of the recommendations for implementation at the unified command level use USEUCOM as the example. Except where otherwise noted, we believe these actions would be beneficial in other commands as well.

- Appoint a "humanitarian advisor"
- Systematically and routinely brief relief agencies on military capabilities
- Integrate civil affairs capabilities into noncrisis operations
- Sponsor conferences and seminars
- Sponsor partnership with the Center of Excellence.

A more detailed division of labor for implementing these steps is suggested in Table 11.1 (pp. 152–153).

Appoint a Humanitarian Advisor

To ensure better familiarity with relief agencies—perhaps the biggest step to improving overall coordination—an individual should be appointed by each unified command to work with NGOs and IOs. (If a unified command or the military in general seeks to emphasize this mission beyond current levels, the appointment of additional individuals should be considered.)

The military generally is unfamiliar with other actors during humanitarian crises. Many officers have some knowledge because of their participation in previous relief efforts, but there is little effort to maintain regular contact or ensure institutional awareness of relief agencies. Although military officers are broadly familiar with the role of ICRC in implementation of the Geneva Conventions, their normal duties do not require them to become familiar with the UN family, NGOs, or the ICRC in its relief capacity. With few exceptions, military officers are not trained to work with these organizations. Joint doctrine identifies important NGOs and sketches their capabilities, but only in a generic fashion.[3] USEUCOM and other unified commands need to know where NGOs are working within their AOR and be at least broadly acquainted with their programs and capabilities for quick response.

For example, no staff entity in USEUCOM currently has a responsibility to ensure that the command is familiar with those NGOs that

[3]Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996), Joint Pub 3-08, pp. D-3 and D-4.

are working within the AOR and those that would likely arrive during a crisis. Some staff do occasionally work with NGOs and IOs, but not as their primary responsibility.

Although U.S. embassies and country teams are often knowledgeable, unified commands cannot count on them to provide information during crisis. Many embassy officials interact with relief agencies from time to time, and some are highly knowledgeable about relief activities. Embassies' primary responsibility, however, is to conduct relations with the host government, leaving them less familiar with NGOs and local conditions outside the capital. Even U.S. embassies within the AOR may not be fully informed or appreciate the unified commands' need for information concerning NGOs. Some embassy country teams are fully informed of current NGO activities, but many are not. Particularly in Africa, embassy personnel are often responsible for multiple countries and are restricted in their access, making them unable to work closely with aid organizations. The USAID representative in an embassy is cognizant of NGO programs sponsored by the U.S. government but not necessarily about efforts sponsored by other governments. The defense attachés in Africa may have little direct contact with NGOs or UN agencies. Moreover, the defense attachés are often associated with host nation military and security personnel, which NGOs may see as part of the problem. Thus, though many country teams are valuable resources, they are not consistent in their knowledge of NGOs and other relief agencies.

To improve its ability to coordinate with NGOs, each unified command should designate a humanitarian affairs advisor—a "HUMAD"—as an individual responsible for crisis liaison with relevant agencies in the UN family and NGOs in the AOR.[4] This individual should be able to offer NGOs access to the command's resources; otherwise, NGOs may feel that the liaison is a one-way street. This same individual should have a working knowledge of relevant agencies in the United Nations. To assist this individual, the command should encourage country teams and defense attachés to track NGO activities and report on them.

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[4]The Joint Commanders-in-Chief wargame on complex operations also recommended the creation of a HUMAD comparable in status to a CINC's political advisor.

The HUMAD should develop personal contact with NGOs. Because NGOs are comparatively nonbureaucratic, their personnel respond better to personal relationships than to institutional ties. All NGO officials interviewed stressed the importance of personal relations—"We want someone in our Rolodex to call," noted one aid official. They will provide information more willingly and in greater detail to an individual known to them than to a faceless organization. The HUMAD should also track unified command personnel with experience in complex emergencies and know which individuals have contacts with relief personnel.[5] During crises, the HUMAD should be the command's primary point of contact with NGOs. The HUMAD might deploy with early arriving forces to help set up a CMOC and otherwise ensure orderly coordination.

Brief Relief Agencies on Military Capabilities

The military can also improve familiarity by briefing relief agencies on the military's capabilities, limits, culture, and procedures. Regular briefings of NGO personnel conducted by the Joint Staff (for U.S.-based NGOs) and the appropriate command elements (for important NGOs active in the AORs) and briefings by relevant service components, such as Air Mobility Command (AMC), would help the relief community gain a more realistic picture of the military.

Most other actors in humanitarian relief operations, especially the NGOs, know even less about the military than the military does about them. With the exception of some retired military officers working for relief agencies, few NGO personnel have experience with the military other than occasional glimpses during major crises. They are bewildered by military organization: They are unacquainted with the unified command structure, know almost nothing about the workings of joint staffs, and do not understand military command and control. They have an unrealistic picture of military capabilities, tending in general to overestimate what the military can accomplish. For example, they think that the military can deploy in

[5]Other staff officers concerned with relief operations can expand their knowledge through training offered by NGOs and academic instruction. The USAF and other services can provide information on NGOs, civil affairs capabilities, and the UN system in service schools.

days or even hours when in fact weeks are required, or they may not understand the limitations of intelligence sources such as overhead imagery. Several NGO officials believed that the U.S. military was lying when it claimed that it could not determine the location of refugees or that bad weather interfered with intelligence collection.

NGOs should become familiar with the military, preferably before a crisis begins, when time is less critical. They should understand enough about military organization and military command and control to facilitate coordination. They need to know where to turn for specific purposes and to understand how the military handles requests for support. They need to know the functions of a CMOC and to appreciate its place in the command and control structure. They need a general appreciation of aerial port operations.

Coordination would also be easier if NGOs appreciated what the military can and cannot do. In past crises, however, even core-team NGOs tended to credit the military with unrealistic capabilities. They assumed that the military could secure their highly dispersed operations, that it could easily disarm combatants, or that it had reliable intelligence on refugee movements. NGOs do not have to become expert in military operations, but they do need more realistic expectations.

Several channels are available to inform other actors, especially NGOs, about the military. Unified commands such as USTRANSCOM and service components such as AMC and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) can prepare and distribute materials. Before an operation, DoD, the Joint Staff, or a unified command should brief NGO representatives. Days before the intervention in Haiti, for example, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) briefed chief executive officers of NGOs concerning the operation. If a Center of Excellence (discussed below) were established, it could mount a continuous, ever-widening effort to familiarize NGOs with the military. As noted below, conferences, seminars, and exercises could also contribute to mutual familiarity.

In all such efforts, the military should strip away extraneous verbiage, including catchwords and self-advertisement. It should keep abbreviations and acronyms to an unavoidable minimum and explain them at every fresh use. It should tailor briefing materials to the

mission, i.e., telling NGOs and other actors only what they need to cooperate smoothly with the military.

Integrate Civil Affairs and Other Specialists into Noncrisis Planning

The unified commands can draw on Civil Affairs and Special Forces personnel to ensure familiarity with NGOs. During Operation Provide Comfort, for example, these personnel established a rapport and close working relationships with NGOs.[6] Special Forces personnel are trained to work with civilian agencies and have personal acquaintance with local conditions. Civil Affairs personnel, particularly within the Army, usually have broad familiarity with NGOs and understand their roles in relief operations.[7]

For precrisis planning, these assets may be of limited utility. The Army has only one active-duty Civil Affairs battalion located at Fort Bragg. All other Civil Affairs assets are in the inactive components and may not be called into active duty in time to participate in crisis response. Because many are located in the reserve forces, they are frequently unavailable for precrisis planning or in the early days of a crisis. Perhaps most important, Civil Affairs and Special Forces personnel are often overextended, given the high demand for peacekeeping operations.

Several steps would allow the military to gain more benefits from Civil Affairs specialists. Expanding Civil Affairs and placing additional units on active status would enable the unified commands to draw on their expertise as needed before a crisis begins. Individuals from these units could then deploy with early arriving forces to ensure smooth coordination. If this status cannot be changed, the commands must more aggressively call upon Civil Affairs personnel in the planning stage, recognizing their potential contribution to these operations. Special Operations forces should be invited to planning meetings, exercises, and other activities that will involve cooperation with relief agencies.

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[6]Seiple (1996), pp. 22–23.

[7]Natsios (1995), p. 79.

Sponsor Conferences and Seminars

Conferences and seminars can be used to familiarize military participants with various agencies and techniques to improve their cooperation or coordination. To be effective, they should be organized around topical themes of mutual interest. The NGOs should represent a spectrum that ensures participants will hear new information and encounter fresh perspectives. If possible, they should include representatives from NGOs that have shown little inclination to seek contact with the military, such as MSF or other core-individual NGOs. They should include key agencies of the United Nations and the ICRC. It will usually be easier to establish familiarity with the ICRC before a crisis than during a crisis when questions of impartiality may arise.

Support a Partnership with a Center of Excellence

USEUCOM and other unified commands should consider supporting a partnership with a Center of Excellence (COE). A COE has benefits for overall familiarization, information sharing, and long-term planning.

As discussed in Chapter Eight, the COE assists coordination and familiarization. It also provides institutional knowledge, which is particularly important given the rapid turnover of military personnel. At a minimum, this partnership might involve dedicating appropriate command assets to working with the COE. More ambitiously, it might require the creation of a small agency analogous to the COE but with a more restricted charter. USEUCOM has no need to duplicate services already performed by existing COEs and generally available to a wider community, such as training in disaster response and data management. But USEUCOM could profit from a small agency (approximately 6–8 people) dedicated to improving humanitarian response within the USEUCOM AOR. The agency might be DoD-funded but responsive to a larger community of interested parties, including not only USEUCOM but also NATO and academic institutions.

More fundamentally, USEUCOM and other unified commands should promote development of DoD-level policy concerning agen-

cies like the COE. Currently, only USPACOM has easy access to such a center (USSOUTHCOM is in the process of establishing a similar center). If each unified command acts independently, some functions will be duplicated and some not accomplished at all, either for lack of sustained interest or lack of funding. Instead, there should be DoD-level policy to ensure that each unified command has easy access to a COE-like activity in its AOR and that all unified commands have access to one or more centers providing common functions.

As Table 11.1 suggests, the tasks associated with assuring NGO-military familiarity require the cooperation of a range of actors, including civilian agencies such as USAID. The armed services and the unified commands can take the lead in ensuring better familiarity, but our recommendations require the support of more than one institution.

IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

The military should encourage initiatives to improve information sharing before and during crises. Such initiatives will enhance the military's and the U.S. government's awareness of likely problems and challenges in the relief operation and increase planning time through better information. Three such initiatives are:

- Identify NGOs with on-the-ground networks
- Minimize disruption caused by classification
- Share after-action reports and improve debriefings.

A more detailed suggested division of labor for implementing these steps is presented in Table 11.2 (pp. 156–157).

USEUCOM and other unified commands must distinguish those NGOs that have strong local networks from those that do not—a distinction that is often vital for judging the quality of information. Although NGO knowledge of local conditions varies from case to case, in general those NGOs with strong grassroots ties often are far better informed than those that do not. Frequently, religious NGOs,

such as ADRA or Catholic Relief Services, have strong local networks as do those working on long-term development, such as CARE.[8] Generalizations are difficult, however, and it would be beneficial if USEUCOM and other commands knew which NGOs had a long-standing grassroots presence in countries in the AOR.

Although the intelligence community has met often with NGOs to share information, there is no policy on this relationship. Primarily for legal reasons, the community does not maintain a database on NGOs and their activities. Both NGOs and intelligence officials are also sensitive to any charges that NGOs have become intelligence sources. As a result, the intelligence community frequently does not know which NGOs are important, what information they possess, or how to access this information. The intelligence community must also disabuse relief personnel of the idea that it is omniscient during a crisis. As one intelligence official noted:

> Some outside the U.S. government think that just because the Government has so many resources devoted to information and intelligence collection and analysis, it MUST know almost everything about almost anything. In fact, that is not true. There are unknowns. There are unknown unknowns. There are unknowables.[9]

Both before and during a crisis, classification concerns disrupt relationships with NGOs by making the information flow appear one-way and raising suspicions that the military or the U.S. government is deliberately concealing information. Another intelligence community member noted that intelligence agencies tend to remove far too much content from intelligence when sanitizing it and are often far too strict when classifying information. NGO personnel do not understand why some information is classified and resent being denied access. They particularly resent being confronted with access problems in a CMOC. The military should consider liberalizing its policy

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[8]Catholic Relief Services, for example, has been active in Rwanda for 33 years and had a presence in Yugoslavia before World War II.

[9]Schoettle (1998).

Table 11.1

Ensuring NGO-Military Familiarity: Suggested Division of Responsibilities

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X Capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Appoint an individual responsible for ensuring familiarity with relief community			Create a Humanitarian Affairs Advisor (HUMAD) position to liase with NGOs and IOs HUMAD will monitor activities of NGOs and IOs in countries within the AOR HUMAD will track command staff with relief experience When necessary, HUMAD will deploy with early arriving forces			
Brief relief community about military capabilities		Provide information on service capabilities in complex contingencies to NGOs and IOs through publications, liaison visits, and exercises	Inform NGOs and IOs of command relationships, capabilities, and planning	Provide information to NGOs through OFDA/ InterAction and to IOs through U.S. Mission to the UN		

Table 11.1—continued

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X Capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Integrate civil affairs and SOF		Strengthen civil affairs and SOF liaison capability; ensure CA and SOF are aware of service-specific needs	Call on CA/SOF for regular briefings on relief agencies before crises begin		Expand civil affairs for peacetime operations	
Sponsor conferences and seminars	Sponsor conferences and seminars related to airlift	Sponsor conference and seminars related to service-specific capabilities	Sponsor conferences on crises in states in the AOR	Sponsor activities such as CJCS Peace Operations Seminar		
Develop and implement the Center of Excellence (COE) concept		Establish contact with the COE for training purposes	Support partnership with the COE Consider establishment of COE-like element in AOR	Establish guidance for COEs across unified commands	Develop policy for COEs; gain funding	USAID/OFDA: Assign personnel to COEs

NOTE: AOR = area of responsibility; CA = Civil Affairs; CJCS = Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; COE = Center of Excellence; HUMAD = Humanitarian Affairs Advisor; IO = international organization; NGO = nongovernment organization; OFDA = Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; SOF = Special Operations Forces; and UN = United Nations.

on classification to improve information sharing during crisis.[10] The military should announce classification guidelines in simple, direct language and classify only that information that would have direct military value to an opponent. It should routinely excise classified information from situation reports and share those reports with NGOs so that all interested agencies will share a common picture of the crisis. Important information to share includes safety, security, and medical information. In general, the U.S. government favors the dissemination of such information to aid agencies.

The military should share unclassified versions of its after-action reports with the United Nations, the ICRC, and NGOs. In return, it should expect to share other agencies' comparable reporting. Most larger operations generate a plethora of after-action reports and performance assessments. An experienced operator remarked, "If we could feed people with assessments, there would be no hungry people." But these reports often remain with the originators rather than being shared.[11] Sharing them would make the military and other actors more acutely aware of mutual problems. Similarly, if the military debriefed knowledgeable NGO personnel, it might improve overall engagement efforts.

When sharing information, however, the military must recognize that even information shared with core-team NGOs will not necessarily be closely held. NGOs in general do not appreciate the need for secrecy and regularly share information with all who will listen. At times, this information may go to partisan NGOs, local warlords, or hostile governments.

As Table 11.2 suggests, the tasks associated with improving information sharing—like the other tasks involved in improving military coordination with relief agencies—requires the cooperation of a range of actors, including several civilian agencies. The unified commands can take the lead in improving information sharing, but all the rec-

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[10]Information sharing with NGOs may require a change in doctrine. Current doctrine notes that, "In the absence of sufficient guidance, command J-2s should share only information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, and is perishable." Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996), Joint Pub 3-08, p. III-21.

[11]Wentz (1998).

ommendations above require the support of more than one institution.

IMPROVE LONG-TERM PLANNING: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Beyond familiarization and information sharing, the unified commands should work with a small number of select NGOs to consider several steps to improve long-term planning and coordination. The small number reflects both the reality of the unified command's limited resources and recognition that the core NGOs do make the largest contributions to relief operations.

Such a selective approach will enable both the unified commands and the NGOs to work more closely before a crisis. These NGOs could help the commands establish better relations with the wider NGO community and serve as partners before trouble erupts. During a crisis, this improved relationship will help speed a deployment and make it more efficient.

The unified commands, the armed services in their Title X capacity, and other U.S. government actors should take these steps:

- Establish continuing contact with key NGOs
- Invite key NGOs into the planning process
- Develop relief packages
- Conduct more realistic exercises
- Consult with key NGOs about emerging crises
- Transport personnel from key NGOs.

A division of labor for implementing these steps is suggested in Table 11.3 (pp. 164–166).

Selection of key NGOs for closer engagement will help focus command efforts. Selection should not imply any discrimination against NGOs that are not selected. To preclude misunderstanding, the list of key NGOs should be informal and not disseminated. There should be no rigid selection criteria and the list should be open to constant revision.

Table 11.2

Improving Information Sharing: Suggested Division of Responsibilities

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X Capacity)	Unified Commands	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Identify NGOs with good local networks			Identify NGOs willing to share information through the HUMAD and COE	Establish national headquarters-level contacts with core NGOs		USAID/OFDA: Inform unified commands of NGO activity in their AORs through InterAction and OCHA
Minimize disruption caused by secrecy			Minimize classification and make it intelligible to IOs and NGOs Prepare and disseminate unclassified after-action reports	Establish guidelines to minimize classification of data relevant to humanitarian assistance		

Table 11.2—continued

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X Capacity)	Unified Commands	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Conduct debriefings and use after-action reports	Debrief TALCE personnel and others involved in air operations	Prepare and share unclassified after-action reports of operations	Conduct after-action conferences to review lessons learned	Make after-action reports available across unified commands and to NGOs at headquarters level	Contribute to after-action reports required by PDD-56	Commerce, Justice, NSC, State: Contribute to after-action reports required by PDD-56

NOTE: AOR = area of responsibility; COE = Center of Excellence; HUMAD = Humanitarian Affairs Advisor; IO = international organization; NGO = nongovernment organization; NSC = National Security Council; OCHA = Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; OFDA = Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; PDD = Presidential Decision Directive; and TALCE = Tanker Airlift Control Element.

The unified commands should experiment by first engaging a few candidates chosen from the list of core NGOs. Initial candidates professional relief organizations that can provide a variety of services and whose personnel have expressed willingness to work with the military. After gaining experience and overcoming any unexpected difficulties, the commands should expand the list until it includes all of the core NGOs. The command might work with USAID and with InterAction to choose the most appropriate NGOs for the AOR. Although working with all relevant NGOs, including specialized and minor organizations, has value, resource constraints will require that the unified command focus only on the most important and capable organizations.

Some NGOs may not want to be selectively engaged, particularly core-individual organizations. Growing NGO recognition of military contributions, however, and the benefits of ties to the military have made even some formerly hostile NGOs more receptive to better relations. The unified commands should encourage all the large and competent NGOs to participate, even while recognizing that during a crisis only those that have developed a solid ability to work with the unified command will receive preferential treatment. Even if many core NGOs choose to remain at arms distance from the military, closer contact with a few core NGOs will help improve unified command planning and relief capabilities.

Establish Continuing Contact

As part of selective engagement, the unified commands would establish appropriate continuing contact with key NGOs. These contacts might not form a consistent pattern. For example, in a highly centralized NGO, a single contact point might suffice, whereas in a less-centralized NGO, several contact points might be necessary to cover the USEUCOM AOR adequately. Both the COE and a HUMAD would be useful in helping the command establish continuing contact.

Establishing contact before a crisis is highly beneficial. As noted above, NGOs rely heavily on personal relationships and are less likely to work with the unified command if they do not know the people involved. More important, relationships forged during a crisis are far more likely to be seen locally as compromising impartiality. If the relationship is long-standing, however, NGOs can better claim that

cooperation with U.S. forces is part of their normal routine rather than a response to a particular warlord's action or other threatening event.

Invite Key NGOs into the Planning Process

After laying the groundwork by establishing close contacts, the unified commands would invite key NGOs to participate in the planning process. Unified commands would invite NGOs to participate both broadly in a deliberate planning process and more explicitly in crisis planning. When planning begins for a joint task force, for example, key NGOs can provide useful information, help estimate relief requirements, and cooperate in providing relief packages.[12] At this stage, the key NGOs will want to hear how the unified command expects the operation to unfold. They will want to hear straightforward briefings on operational topics, which will demonstrate that the command wants to cooperate with NGOs and views cooperation as a two-way relationship.

Ideally, NGOs will change their procedures and activities to capitalize on command capabilities. NGOs will not accept tasking or formally designate responsibilities, but, if they believe cooperation with the command is in their interest, they will change their procedures accordingly. In a narrow sense, the unified commands cannot plan efforts of agencies that are not bound by their plans. But they can plan to support or accommodate these agencies' efforts on the assumption that they might participate. Thus, if the unified commands can improve the relief community's access to lift, communications, security, and other unified command assets, the agencies would be more likely to cooperate with the unified commands.

Develop Relief Packages

A logical third step would be to develop common understanding of relief packages that key NGOs could provide during a humanitarian crisis. With better coordination, the unified commands could help transport and distribute aid packages in the first few days of a crisis,

[12] Dworken (1996), p. 25.

when military assets may be the only ones available. NGO-provided packages might be designed to address particular needs, such as water purification, food, shelter, sanitation, immunization, or they might be fully rounded survival packages. At a minimum, measles vaccines, oral rehydration salts, and chlorine are highly useful in the early days of a crisis. Unified commands and key NGOs could then estimate the types and amounts of military or commercial lift that would be required to deliver the packages under various scenario assumptions.[13] The packages could then be integrated into planning contingencies. The unified commands should work with USAID and the Department of State to ensure adequate funding for these initiatives.

Some key NGOs have external quick-response capabilities, drawing upon expatriate personnel and prepositioned supplies. Others depend more heavily on internal capabilities, using indigenous personnel and local contracts. But even in this case, the NGOs may require assistance from the U.S. military during the initial phase of a crisis. The unified commands need to understand these varying capabilities and how assistance might be packaged to arrive most expeditiously.

Conduct More Useful Exercises

Many current exercises do not fully meet NGO or unified command needs and thus are less useful for long-term planning. Some exercises are not realistic regarding the role of relief agencies, and others take the cooperation of relief agencies for granted. Most NGOs, especially the core organizations, are busy responding to nearly continuous crises. NGO personnel usually schedule their time closely and resent wasting it. They are quick to sense when their participation is marginal or mere atmospherics.

When asked to participate in exercises, NGO personnel should be players whose inputs make a difference. In addition, they should be asked to help prepare the exercises or at least be consulted concern-

[13]Currently, OFDA is exploring an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC), which leads NGOs to specialize and prepare to meet a particular need. This, in turn, is leading many smaller NGOs to consolidate in order to receive U.S. funding.

ing appropriate roles for NGOs. To the extent possible, exercises should include free play that allows NGOs to act as they would in the field. Few NGO representatives will evince much interest in scripted play. Finally, exercises should not be designed to flow smoothly. They should raise difficult problems that have recurred in past operations such as chaotic airflow, the presence of refugees on a runway, or competing priorities for lift. Ideally, NGOs would also be brought into field exercises, as this is more likely to force them to demonstrate their flexibility and innovation, which are among their greatest assets during a real crisis. Raising such problems in exercises can help NGOs in particular to appreciate how uncoordinated efforts can make the entire operation less effective.

To get the most from UN and NGO players, unified commands should grant them major roles. The United Nations and NGOs, not the unified commands, will normally provide the bulk of humanitarian aid and nearly all of the interface with recipients. The unified commands support these other actors by responding to their requirements. They are not incidental to the operation; they are central to its very purpose. Therefore, an exercise should reflect their centrality and allow them to be as demanding and even obstreperous as they would be during an actual crisis. To obtain this effect, the unified commands should obtain, if possible, participation by NGOs that are less inclined to cooperate or more zealous in preserving their neutrality. Core-individualist NGOs such as MSF would be ideal participants. The whole point is to learn how the unified commands can support relief efforts by other actors, not how they might fit into unified commands' planning.

The unified commands should also consider paying the expenses that NGOs incur during exercises. Even the larger NGOs have limited budgets for activities outside their normal programs. Offering reimbursement would make participation easier for them. For specialized NGOs, financial assistance may be essential.

Consult with Key NGOs in Crisis Situations

During an emerging crisis, the unified commands should consult with key NGOs to obtain their views on impending humanitarian disasters and appropriate international responses. Such consulta-

tion would enrich the commands' understanding of the situation, help the commands recognize the requirements, and prepare for smoother execution of relief operations. Under condition of confidentiality, the commands might consult with key NGOs even before tasking from the national command authority (NCA) in order to better meet NCA directives. However, the commands would have to define their position clearly to avoid false expectations of support. When coordinating in advance, unified command officials must remember that relief agencies are often open with information, and shared information may not be handled discreetly.

Transport Personnel from Key NGOs

As an inducement to improve cooperation, the United States could offer to transport personnel from key NGOs during crises using military aircraft and other transportation assets. These personnel might include managers, sanitation experts, medical specialists, and others whose services were urgently required. Both U.S. military personnel and NGO officials noted that almost every other country's military was more able and willing to transfer personnel than the United States.[14]

The U.S. military should consider both increasing its transport of relief personnel in emergencies and transporting core-team personnel more frequently in other situations. In an urgent humanitarian crisis, the CINC can approve the transport of small numbers of urgently needed civilian personnel using military aircraft if no commercial aircraft are available. In nonemergency situations—but ones where commercial transport is not available—the command should work with DoD for exemptions needed to transport vital personnel. Before a crisis occurs, the command could also preclear with DoD a small group of NGO personnel for transport by military aircraft. In a crisis, these precleared individuals could more expeditiously be transported on military aircraft.

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[14]Under the Denton Program, for example, only cargo can be transported by space available; people require dedicated flights. This restriction ensures that the Air Force does not compete with commercial carriers and also limits its liability.

As Table 11.3 suggests, improving long-term planning requires considerable support by both the unified commands and several U.S. government agencies, particularly the Department of State and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The armed services would provide selective contributions related to service-specific concerns, but the primary burden would be on the unified command. U.S. government agencies and the Joint Staff would work closely with relief agencies at the headquarters level and provide guidance, respectively.

AVOID THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

Being selective is a practical necessity, if only because the commands could not afford to cultivate relationships with hundreds of NGOs indiscriminately. However, there are potential pitfalls to selective engagement that the unified command and the military in general should recognize in advance and take care to avoid.

Allegations of Favoritism

Other NGOs might notice that key NGOs receive more attention and oppose selective engagement as a result. Some NGOs might acknowledge that greater capabilities understandably imply closer relations, while others might feel slighted.[15] In the latter case, the other NGOs might insist on equal treatment or even raise the issue with their donors and political constituencies.

Networking and inter-NGO relations are important to all NGOs, which means that peer opinion affects their willingness to cooperate with the military. Even core NGOs might hesitate to work closely with the military if other NGOs objected. NGOs are vulnerable to accusations of having "sold out"—being used as an instrument of U.S. policy rather than to serve humanity. The growth in NGO numbers and influence results from their ability to network, strategize, and

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[15] NGOs are accustomed to being divided into "establishment" and "anti-establishment" groups. Although there are many rivalries and disputes among them, the NGOs in general have learned to use this diversity to good strategic effect. This will probably remain true even if a select few are "certified" and others are not.

Table 11.3

Improving Long-Term Planning: Suggested Division of Responsibilities

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Establish contact with core NGOs			HUMAD and COE-like element maintain continuing contacts; key officers (CINC, J-3, J-5,) component commanders have sporadic contacts at country level	J-5: Maintain continuing contacts with core NGOs at headquarters level		USAID/OFDA: Maintain continuing contacts at headquarters level
Invite core NGOs into the planning process	Invite core NGOs to participate in planning airlift		Invite NGOs to contribute to pre-planning and crisis response			

Table 11.3—continued

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Encourage NGOs to develop relief packages	Advise on airlift; develop mechanisms and procedures for prompt airlift of relief packages		Identify NGOs with rapid-response capabilities in AOR Plan command support of relief packages (both TRANSCOM and regional commands) Develop procedures and mechanisms for prompt delivery of relief packages	J-5: Provide guidance to unified commands for military support of relief packages		State and USAID: Host conferences of IOs, NGOs, and CINCs developing relief packages Fund relief package development
Conduct more useful exercises	Conduct exercises that focus on air-flow issues	Encourage IOs and NGOs to participate in planning on service-specific concerns Give IOs and NGOs substantive roles to play	Encourage IOs and NGOs to participate in planning Give IOs and NGOs substantive roles to play Conduct exercises that integrate military and civilian efforts	Contribute to PDD-56 exercises Draw unified commands into PDD-56 exercises	Promote, sponsor, and contribute to PDD-56 exercises	NSC and State: Promote, sponsor, and contribute to PDD-56 exercises

Table 11.3—continued

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Consult with core NGOs about emerging crises	Consult with core NGOs about airlift requirements and capabilities		Solicit views of NGOs at country level through HUMAD and the COE			USAID/OFDA: Solicit views of key NGOs at headquarters level
Transport NGO personnel during crisis			Maintain updated rosters of pre-approved NGOs personnel through HUMAD	J-4/J-5: Provide guidance to unified commands concerning transport of NGO personnel	Establish policy for transport of NGO personnel during crisis	USAID/OFDA: Request NGOs maintain updated rosters of key personnel eligible for transport by DoD

NOTE: COE = Center of Excellence; HUMAD = Humanitarian Affairs Advisor; IO = international organization; NGO = non-government organization; NSC = National Security Council; OFDA = Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; PDD = Presidential Decision Directive; TRANSCOM = U.S. Transportation Command; and UN = United Nations.

divide tasks between them. As a recent study carefully documents, the NGO community has shown a remarkable aptitude for maintaining cohesion in the face of national and international efforts to drive wedges between them and to make clever tactical use of their differences.[16] For example, "establishment" NGOs who gain admission to official meetings will generally be scrupulous about holding briefings, strategy sessions, and the like with those NGOs who failed to make the cut. The better established ones lobby, sit on UN committees, and help draft resolutions, but they know that at least part of their weight comes from the fact that other NGOs are in front of the building with placards, demonstrating and issuing protest statements about a current policy.

To prevent charges of "selling out" from arising, the unified commands should keep selective engagement informal and flexible. It should treat smaller NGOs with respect and keep them well informed of command initiatives that could affect relief operations. It should also stress that attention is given strictly because of an NGO's overall capabilities and ability to work with the U.S. military: If smaller NGOs develop these traits, then they too will receive closer attention.

Concerns Regarding Independence

Key NGOs would avoid closer relationships with unified commands if they feared that their independence could be compromised. Although most regularly receive U.S. government funding, they rightly insist on the neutrality and impartiality implicit in their humanitarian charters. Quite apart from moral considerations, they arguably would be less useful to the U.S. government if they were not independent. The unified commands can avoid raising such concerns if they recognize two principles: (1) in relief operations, the military normally supports NGOs, not the other way around, and (2) relations between the military and NGOs are voluntary and cooperative. During actual deployments, U.S. forces must also recognize that NGOs may vacillate in their willingness to associate with the military and that preserving NGO impartiality is likely to facilitate overall success.

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[16]The growth of NGO influence as a result of a determined networking, planning, and strategic effort is well documented in Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler (1998).

Cross-Purposes

The relationship of military authorities with NGOs is usually mediated by U.S. government agencies except during actual operations when direct contact, for example through a CMOC, becomes essential. Often, OFDA or a country team works directly with NGOs while the military responds to tasking. By bringing the military into direct contact with NGOs, selective engagement risks leading the military to work at cross-purposes with other government agencies. For example, USAID might prefer one of its traditional U.S.-based NGO partners for a particular task, whereas USEUCOM might prefer an NGO based in Europe.

To prevent disconnects of this sort, the unified commands should keep relevant U.S. government agencies informed of its precrisis engagement and during crisis it should work closely with them. Close coordination with U.S. government agencies that also work with NGOs will be necessary in any event to ensure the success of selective engagement. OFDA can encourage elements of selective engagement, such as relief packages, with financial support. In general, NGOs will be more inclined to cooperate with the military if they realize that their ties to the U.S. government will improve if they do.

Strain on NGOs

A demanding engagement strategy might put too much strain on key NGOs. In interviews, several large NGOs noted that they could not afford to provide personnel to attend all activities sponsored by the military. From their perspective, the military is a gigantic organization that can easily overwhelm their slender personnel resources. To avoid putting too much strain on key NGOs, the unified command should make contacts brief and intense with little wasted time. It should also send its officers to the key NGOs rather than always having NGO personnel come to them.

Unfounded Expectations

Unless carefully managed, selective engagement could raise unfounded expectations among key NGOs. Past military support for relief operations has often been episodic, unpredictable, and driven

by political motives. Selective engagement could convey an impression that the U.S. government is initiating a new policy of broader and steadier support but then disappoint NGOs if the U.S. government chooses not to intervene in a particular crisis. To avoid raising unfounded expectations, the unified commands should make certain key NGOs understand that large-scale military support is contingent upon NCA tasking case-by-case.

IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF THE RELIEF FLOW: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

The regional commands and USTRANSCOM can use their tremendous logistics capabilities to improve the overall flow of relief goods to a crisis region. Particularly in the early days of a crisis, the flow of relief is chaotic and sporadic, which can lead to shortages of critical goods, delays, and other problems. In general, ground transportation presents few problems for NGOs and IOs. Airlift, and to a lesser extent, sealift, is a far more complex problem, and NGOs lack the ability to manage large relief efforts that involve these forms of transportation.

Poor coordination, approaching chaos at times, is a recurring problem in humanitarian airflow. During Operation Support Hope, there was near chaos at receiving airports. In some instances, civilian aircraft chartered by NGOs simply appeared unannounced and had to be diverted because of congestion. Initially, there was little overall prioritization of relief efforts, so that unneeded items were as likely to arrive as desperately needed items. Rwanda is a particularly striking and dramatic example, but similar lack of coordination afflicts airflow during nearly every large humanitarian operation.

Better coordination of the relief flow requires several interrelated tasks that necessarily involve a large number of actors including host countries, donors, the United Nations, and NGOs. The military as a whole and unified commands in particular have only limited influence over some of these actors, but they can promote workable solutions. Success requires a strong effort by other U.S. government agencies, to which the services and Department of Defense could contribute. Fundamental tasks include:

- Set overall priorities for the relief effort
- Ensure adherence to a common schedule
- Provide logistics management control and off-loading.

A more detailed division of labor for implementing these steps is suggested in Table 11.4 (pp. 176–177).

Set Priorities for Relief Effort

The first and most important step is to set priorities for relief efforts based on a common understanding of the amounts and types of aid that are required over time. The military cannot set these priorities but it needs them to work efficiently. As noted earlier, the structure that sets priorities may be characterized as host country, United Nations, alliance, or coalition.

If a host country maintains governance, it may set priorities or it may simply welcome any assistance that arrives. In such cases, the military usually operates in mixed-use facilities, sharing port facilities, ramp space, and slot times with civilian organizations. Host country authorities may willingly cede de facto control or executive agency status to the military when they perceive that it can operate airports most efficiently. Often, the host country may offer only partial use of an airfield for the relief effort.

If the United Nations takes the lead with the support of the U.S. government, the unified commands should coordinate closely with offices of its key agencies in Geneva and with their representatives in the field. Through its own actions, the unified commands should support whatever option the United Nations has chosen to coordinate its response, whether through an Emergency Response Coordinator or through a lead agency such as UNHCR.

Within the USEUCOM AOR, for example, NATO might assume control, especially for relief efforts in the Balkans. The entire Alliance might act pursuant to decisions taken in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), or a coalition of willing members might use Alliance resources. In either case, the Alliance would have to set priorities in cooperation with agencies of the United Nations, which would also

be involved. Almost certainly, Alliance members would also be the largest donor states.

An individual country might lead others, as the United States did during Operation Provide Comfort. Within the USEUCOM AOR, the lead state might be the United States, France, or possibly Italy, as during Operation Alba. This lead state would set priorities in cooperation with other interested states, whether participants in the operations or merely donors, and with UN agencies. If a foreign country were to lead, USEUCOM (or other unified command) would have to establish liaison with its military authorities. Once an operation is under way, USEUCOM can establish a CMOC. It should then become a forum to reach agreement on priorities among relief providers.

Both the regional unified commands and USTRANSCOM (particularly AMC) must ensure that goods moved under space-available flight provisions follow relief priorities. Currently, items shipped under space available are not prioritized: What is shipped first depends on local flight availability and chance. The goal of planners is to maximize what is sent, not to ensure that what is sent is needed immediately. The unified commands and USTRANSCOM should explore ways to prioritize space-available cargo when possible.

Ensure Adherence to a Schedule

Once priorities are set, the next concern is to ensure adherence to a common schedule. Aid often arrives haphazardly and chokes small ports or airfields. Especially in the early days of a crisis, NGOs and UN agencies are not able to manage the complex and massive aid flows, particularly if they involve airlift.

Schedule problems are particularly acute for effective airlift. All relief agencies that conduct or sponsor flights into the affected region must accept their places in the aid queue and plan flights accordingly. They must conform to appropriate procedures regarding slot times and other crucial aspects of the operations such as allocation of ramp space.

Usually the military will lack authority to ensure complete adherence to schedules, but it can work through the coordination structure to

encourage adherence. It can emphasize to host countries that maintaining a proper schedule will ultimately raise the level of humanitarian assistance, even if some flights must be turned away. It can work through UN agencies and ultimately through donor countries to ensure that all NGOs are kept informed on procedures. Most of the larger NGOs receive substantial funding through governmental channels and through UN agencies and are anxious to impress these sponsors with their reliability and professionalism. Although NGOs might complain about restrictions on movement, interviews suggest they would comply as fully as possible with procedures imposed by large donors. Many NGOs also recognize the problems that come with anarchic flow of aid and thus are more willing to cooperate.

Admittedly, perfect adherence to schedules will seldom be possible, even when an individual state leads the operation. There will almost always be donor nations that act unilaterally, UN agencies that fail to coordinate perfectly, and NGOs (especially smaller, less professional ones) that send or sponsor flights without reference to schedules. In some instances, lack of compliance may be willful, reflecting political decisions or rivalry among agencies. In other instances, lack of compliance may be inadvertent, reflecting inexperience or innocent zeal.

Provide Logistics Management

USTRANSCOM and the service staffs can support the regional unified command in an effort to help manage the flow of aid. NGOs and UN agencies in general are experienced with transporting goods by land. Moreover, they often have in-place networks that have been delivering aid long before the NCA decided to act. For aid delivered by sea, however, USTRANSCOM can help coordinate the flow and improve port assets. This logistics assistance should be provided until UN agencies and NGOs have the personnel in place to assume responsibility for the effort.

Improving airlift should be a key part of the logistics effort; this capability is weak among NGOs and is often important in sudden and massive crises, in which relief agencies may be overwhelmed. USAF elements in USTRANSCOM can perform air traffic control and other functions essential to efficient airport operations. AMC has Tanker

Airlift Control Elements (TALCE)—and other air traffic management assets that contribute to an Air Mobility Element (AME) for larger operations—constantly on alert to support airlift in the context of military operations. The capability embodied by TALCE is virtually unique to the United States. Among the NATO allies, only France has a comparable capability to maintain her overseas commitments. It is not clear whether NATO itself could perform as well. WFP can manage only smaller airlifts within its own programs. UNHCR has no capability to direct an airflow, unless it is augmented as it was during the Rwanda operation. Therefore, in a humanitarian crisis that requires rapid deployment, there may be no practical alternative to U.S. TALCE. Over time, when airlift becomes more routine, the TALCE can hand off its activities to the host nation, the United Nations, or other body.

USTRANSCOM, USEUCOM, and other commands could prepare for deployment of TALCE in support of relief operations in several ways. They could conduct training and exercises that include coordination of civilian aircraft in scenarios involving humanitarian aid. (TALCEs normally control only U.S. military airlift and control civilian aircraft by exception.) They could acquaint UN agencies and NGOs with the capabilities of TALCEs. Without committing the United States to any particular course of action, they could explore with OCHA and UNHCR how TALCEs might be used. USEUCOM's 86th Contingency Response Group (CRG), set up to rapidly deploy and run an airfield, performed well during Operation Shining Hope and should be emulated by other commands. Augmenting the CRG with personnel familiar with NGOs would make it even more effective.

Air traffic control assets should be employed as early as possible in a crisis, subject of course to diplomatic realities. Often, a TALCE is called in only after a problem develops, and at times is not deployed until weeks into a crisis. An AME may not be used at all. Because the early days of a crisis are often the most deadly and chaotic, employing this capacity earlier—even if at times it is not absolutely necessary—could help the relief effort considerably. Once employed, a Temporary Flight Restriction could be issued, to let all carriers know they must have prior permission to land from the air traffic control

element, acting on behalf of the host nation or the lead country or agency.[17]

USTRANSCOM, USEUCOM, and other commands could also prepare to receive foreign personnel, including personnel drawn from UN agencies and NATO militaries, into TALCEs during relief operations. Foreign personnel could provide expertise from their national forces. In addition, their presence would give a TALCE an international flavor that would make donor nations less reluctant to accept control than if the TALCE were exclusively composed of U.S. personnel. But to ensure efficiency, foreign personnel should augment a TALCE, not occupy key positions. It would be impractical to assemble a truly international TALCE during crisis.

As Table 11.4 outlines, most of the burden for ensuring a smoother flow of aid will fall upon the service components, particularly the USAF, and the unified commands. The services will provide the capability, and both the services and the commands will ensure that adequate procedures exist for relief agencies to use the capability. A smoother aid flow will also require the effective transmission of priorities to the relevant military officials. In the early days of a crisis, this will be done primarily by the lead nation or agency; over time, as the CMOC is established, operational priorities will be generated locally, with U.S. government agencies providing political input.

ESTABLISH INITIATIVES WITH ALLIES

Relief operations are increasingly multinational and complex, with ever-increasing interaction between civilian actors and military establishments. European allies are a leading part of this equation, worldwide. European NGOs are among the most active in humani-

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[17] In a crisis, TALCEs might be organized in two different ways. Broadly speaking, air operations might be centralized or decentralized, depending upon the exigencies of the situation. During the Rwanda operation, UNHCR received augmentation from USEUCOM and attempted to exert centralized control from Geneva, analogous to an arrangement made to control airlift in Bosnia. In Bosnia, this arrangement was appropriate because a single airport (Sarajevo) dominated traffic. But this arrangement was inappropriate in Rwanda because the operation involved several destination and staging airports whose operations could not be efficiently controlled from Geneva. Moreover, Geneva was less well informed of the rapidly developing situation than were elements on the ground in Rwanda and Zaire.

tarian relief, and the European Union itself is emerging as the largest humanitarian actor in key regions. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, NATO's role in relief operations in the Euro-Atlantic area has become more prominent, raising new issues of coordination and civil-military relations. This analysis suggests a number of key findings and points to areas for new initiatives at the strategic and operational levels.

U.S. and USAF policy should aim at capturing useful synergies with European allies. At the strategic level, decisionmakers can take advantage of existing European defense relationships, facilities, and experience, especially in Africa. Similarly, the U.S. comparative advantage in technical intelligence on regional developments can be reinforced by European strengths in intelligence collection on the ground. At the operational level, U.S. capacity for strategic airlift complements the European capacity for tactical lift that most humanitarian contingencies require. Many of these recommendations will require broad support from civilian agencies of the U.S. government.

Strategic and Political Initiatives

Given the growing role of European allies and changes in the involvement of key organizations, there are now worthwhile opportunities to improve cooperation with allies at the strategic level.

- *Strengthen NATO's capacity for civil emergency planning and humanitarian relief.* Building on the experience in IFOR/SFOR and KFOR and as part of the implementation of NATO's new Strategic Concept, the relevant organizations within NATO (especially the EADRCC) should be strengthened, particularly by providing the necessary resources for training and exercises with partner countries. The profile of civil emergency planning might be raised through the establishment of a NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Civil Emergency Planning. Among other responsibilities, a NATO ASG for Civil Emergency Planning could facilitate Alliance planning and coordination with key IOs and NGOs. The Kosovo experience should spur interest in high-level dialogue between the Alliance and UN organizations.

Table 11.4

Ensuring a Smoother Relief Flow: Suggested Division of Responsibilities

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X Capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Set overall priorities for the relief effort	Prioritize space available in support of USTRANSCOM		Perform command assessment of requirements for humanitarian relief Establish CMOC with direct connection to Operations Center and Air Cell Encourage IOs and NGOs to develop local priorities within CMOC			Before CMOC established, pass priorities down in consultation with on-the-scene NGOs After CMOC established, pass political priorities to Air Cell and other logistics cells

Table 11.4—continued

Task	USAF	All Services (Title X Capacity)	Unified Command	Joint Staff	DoD	Other U.S. Government
Ensure adherence to common procedures	Prepare for foreign personnel assisting a TALCE and directly participating in its operations		Establish and promulgate procedures through HOC and CMOC Establish procedures and pre-CMOC interface to ensure smooth delivery of early arriving goods and personnel (USTRANSCOM) Establish interface with relief agencies to provide cargo data, schedule slot times, etc. (USTRANSCOM and regional commands)	Develop and promulgate joint doctrine on common airlift procedures		USAID/OFDA: Require core NGOs to adhere to common airlift procedures Encourage core NGOs to develop common coordination procedures for early arriving relief
Provide early cargo traffic control and off-loading	Prepare TALCE and other necessary assets (comparable to 86th CRG) to manage humanitarian lift		Use logistics management capabilities to assist humanitarian relief effort Establish operational links to USTRANSCOM Ensure rapidly deployed forces have staff with NGO expertise available			

NOTE: CMOC = civil-military operations center; CRG = Contingency Response Group; HOC = Humanitarian Operations Center; IO = international organization; NGO = nongovernment organization; OFDA = Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; TALCE = Tanker Airlift Control Element; USTRANSCOM = U.S. Transportation Command.

- *Put transatlantic cooperation in humanitarian crises high on the prospective EU-NATO agenda.* EU-NATO consultations will be a necessity as the EU's common foreign and security policy evolves. Many of the contingencies in which NATO (especially U.S.) assets may be placed at the disposal of future European-led operations are likely to be humanitarian in nature. Humanitarian early warning and contingency planning should be key—and relatively uncontroversial—agenda items for EU-NATO dialogue.
- *Engage European allies in multilateral activities to bolster local capacity for humanitarian and peace support operations.* The United States and the EU, as well as key allies such as France and Britain, have made this approach a focal point of their regional security strategies. Multilateral exercises on the pattern of those already conducted in Africa should be continued and might usefully be extended to regions such as the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Pacific.

Operational Initiatives

This analysis makes a number of recommendations for improved cooperation with allies, and through allied institutions, at the operational level.

- *Explore arrangements to take advantage of French facilities and European relationships in and around Africa to support relief operations.* French opinion is sensitive to U.S. policy and presence in Africa. But within limits, the humanitarian context may be one in which more formal access arrangements are possible. Expanded military-to-military cooperation (e.g., between USAFE and the French airlift command) may be the best vehicle for this. Even more important, training and exercises with European militaries, where possible in conjunction with local militaries, can contribute to local knowledge and working relationships in advance of future expeditionary deployments.
- *Promote interoperability and standardization in airlift/airdrop with European allies.* Key European militaries are interested in this objective, and given the large role of NGOs in this arena through commercial charters, cooperation could be extended to civilian actors, where appropriate. Particularly important are

steps to enhance traffic management for military and commercial airlift.

- *Provide NGO spaces at relevant courses and war colleges*. NATO has invited representation from UN organizations at the NATO School at Oberammergau and the NATO Defense College in Rome. U.S. and European NGO representatives could also be included in training in relevant areas such as civil-emergency planning, logistics, force protection, and civil-military relations.

Initiatives along these lines can help to advance the level of cooperation with European allies in an area where Europe has a relatively full capacity for burdensharing. Military support to relief operations outside the NATO area is a sphere in which Europe already plays a leading role. In terms of overall humanitarian assistance, the EU is itself a leading actor—and this role is set to increase. In operational terms, there is significant "value added" to be gained from a closer operational relationship with allies given the European networks in Africa and elsewhere. These networks can be valuable in helping to anticipate and prepare for complex relief operations in an expeditionary environment.

Finally, the prospect of a greater NATO role in managing humanitarian crises through the Alliance's civil emergency planning structures and as a result of changing missions will benefit the United States and the USAF. In most cases, a NATO frame will facilitate working with allies and will help to institutionalize patterns of coordination with NGOs and international organizations.

FINAL WORDS

There are no complete solutions to the operational and coordination problems discussed in this study. Many of the solutions to these problems lie outside the USAF's, and the broader U.S. military's, spheres of responsibility. Many fixes dictate actions across the U.S. government, requiring the services, the unified commands, the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense, and civilian agencies to work closely together. Coordination on complex emergencies within relevant agencies of the U.S. government, however, is often poor, making

problems that affect military performance difficult to solve.[18] Moreover, as the analysis in this study makes clear, U.S. institutions must work with UN agencies and NGOs, which have their own limits.

At a more fundamental level, the United States has not decided whether intervention in complex emergencies will be a central task for its military or a collateral one in the coming decades. Until that decision is made, the resources necessary to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces for interventions in crises, and the associated doctrinal developments, are likely to be lacking. Civilian agencies may not take the appropriate steps to improve their coordination with the military until this decision is made.

By keeping in mind the likely resource limits and policy constraints that stem from this indecision, military planners can help reduce overly optimistic expectations about what relief operations can accomplish and anticipate likely operational problems. Equally important, the military can improve coordination with relief agencies and with U.S. allies, thus avoiding some of these problems and minimizing others. The recommendations suggested in this chapter would make future operations go more smoothly, with fewer disruptions that can exacerbate the suffering of victims of humanitarian crises.

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[18] Pirnie (1998).